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1 Introduction
Trade reforms have the potential to deliver substantial benefits to economies by forcing a more
efficient allocation of resources. A large body of theoretical and empirical literature has analyzed
the mechanisms behind this process. When trade barriers fall, aggregate productivity rises as less
productive firms exit and the remaining firms expand (e.g., Melitz (2003) and Pavcnik (2002))
and take advantage of cheaper or previously unavailable imported inputs (e.g., Goldberg et al.
(2010a) and Halpern et al. (2011)). Trade reforms have also been shown to reduce markups (e.g.,
Levinsohn (1993) and Harrison (1994)). Based on this evidence, we should expect trade reforms
to exert downward pressure on firm prices. However, we have little direct evidence on how prices
respond to liberalization because they are rarely observed during trade reforms. We fill this gap
by developing a unified framework to estimate jointly markups and marginal costs from production
data, and examine how prices, and their underlying markup and cost components, adjust during
India's comprehensive trade liberalization.
Our paper makes three main contributions. First, we develop a unified framework to estimate
markups and marginal costs of multi-product firms across a broad set of manufacturing industries.
Since these measures are unobserved, we must impose some structure on the data. However, our
approach does not require assumptions on consumer demand, market structure or the nature of
competition common in industrial organization studies. This flexibility is particularly appealing in
settings when one wants to infer the full distribution of markups across firms and products over
time in different manufacturing sectors. Since prices are observed, we can directly recover marginal
costs from the markup estimates. Our approach is quite general and since data containing this level
of detail are becoming increasingly available, this methodology is useful to researchers studying
other countries and industries. The drawback of this approach is that we are unable to perform
counterfactual simulations since we do not explicitly model consumer demand and firm pricing
behavior.
The second and key contribution of our study is towards the methodology to estimate production
functions. In order to infer markups, the proposed approach requires estimates of production
functions. Typically, these estimates have well-known biases if researchers use revenue rather than
quantity data. Estimates of true productivity (or marginal costs) are confounded by demand
shocks and markups, and these biases may be severe (see Foster et al. (2008)). De Loecker (2011)
demonstrates that controlling for demand shocks substantially attenuates the productivity increases
in response to trade reforms in the European Union textile industry. That paper addresses the
bias arising from unobserved output prices (the so-called output price bias) by introducing a CES
demand system in the analysis. In contrast to that approach, we address the output price-bias by
estimating a quantity-based production function using data that contain the prices and quantities
of firms' products over time. The focus on a quantity-based production function highlights the
need for the estimation to address two additional biases that have not received much attention in
the literature: the bias stemming from the unobserved allocation of inputs across products within
multi-product firms and the bias stemming from unobserved input prices (or the use of (quality)
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differentiated inputs) by firms - the so-called input price bias. Our study contributes an approach
to address these biases.
Third, existing studies that have analyzed the impact of trade reforms on markups have focused
exclusively on the competitive effects from declines in output tariffs (e.g., Levinsohn (1993) and
Harrison (1994)). Comprehensive reforms also lower tariffs on imported inputs and previous work,
particularly on India, has emphasized this aspect of trade reforms (e.g., see Goldberg et al. (2009)).
These two tariff reductions represent distinct shocks to domestic firms. Lower output tariffs increase
competition by changing the residual demand that firms face. Conversely, firms benefit from lower
costs of production when input tariffs decline. It is important to account for both channels of lib-
eralization to understand the overall impact of trade reforms on prices and markups. In particular,
declines in markups depend on the extent to which firms pass these cost savings to consumers, the
pass-through being influenced by both the market structure and nature of demand. For example, in
models with monopolistic competition and CES demand, markups are constant and so by assump-
tion, pass-through of tariffs on prices is complete. Arkolakis et al. (2012) demonstrate that several
of the influential trade models assume constant markups and by doing so, abstract away from the
markup channel as a potential source of gains from trade. This is the case in Ricardian models that
assume perfect competition, such as Eaton and Kortum (2002), and models with monopolistic com-
petition such as Krugman (1980) and its heterogeneous firm extensions like Melitz (2003). There
are models that can account for variable markups by imposing some structure on demand and mar-
ket structure.1 While these studies allow for richer patterns of markup adjustment, the empirical
results on markups and pass-through ultimately depend on the underlying parametric assumptions
imposed on consumer demand and nature of competition. Ideally, we want to understand how trade
reforms affect markups without having to rely on explicit parametric assumptions of the demand
systems and/or market structures, which themselves may change with trade liberalization.
The structure of our analysis is as follows. We use production data to infer markups by exploiting
the optimality of firms' variable input choices. Our approach is based on Hall (1988) and De Loecker
and Warzynski (2012), but we extend their methodology to account for multi-product firms and
to take advantage of observable price data and physical quantity of products. The key assumption
we need to infer markups is that firms minimize cost; then, markups are the deviation between
the elasticity of output with respect to a variable input and that input's share of total revenue.
We obtain this output elasticity from estimates of production functions across many industries. As
noted above, in contrast to many studies, we utilize physical quantity data rather than revenues
to estimate the production functions.2 This alleviates the concern that the production function
estimation is contaminated by prices, yet presents different challenges that we discuss in detail in
Section 3. Most importantly, using physical quantity data forces us to conduct the analysis at
1See Goldberg (1995), Bernard et al. (2003), Goldberg and Verboven (2005), Atkeson and Burstein (2008), Melitz
and Ottaviano (2008), Feenstra and Weinstein (2010), Nakamura and Zerom (2010), Edmonds et al. (2011), Goldberg
and Hellerstein (2013), Arkolakis et al. (2012), Mayer et al. (2014) and Atkin and Donaldson (2014).
2Foster et al. (2008) also use quantity data in their analysis of production functions, but they focus on a set of
homogeneous products.
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the product level since without a demand system to aggregate across products, prices and physical
quantities are only defined at the product level.
The approach we propose calls for an explicit treatment of multi-product firms. We show
how to exploit data on single-product firms along with a sample selection correction to obtain
consistent estimates of the production functions. The benefit of using single-product firms at the
production function estimation stage is that it does not require assumptions on how firms allocate
inputs across products, something we do not observe in our data.3 This approach assumes that the
physical relationship between inputs and outputs is the same for single- and multi-product firms
that manufacture the same product. That is, a single-product firm uses the same technology to
produce rickshaws as a multi-product firm that produces rickshaws and cars. While this assumption
may appear strong, it is already implicitly employed in all previous work that pools data across
single- and multi-product firms (e.g., Olley and Pakes (1996) or Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)).
Importantly, the assumption of the same physical production structure does not rule out economies
of scope, which can operate through higher (factor-neutral) productivity of multi-product firms, the
spreading of fixed costs across multiple products, or lower input prices for multi-product firms (as
long as they are not related to input quantities). Once we estimate the production functions from
the single-product firms, we show how to back out allocation of inputs across products within a
multi-product firm. We obtain the markups for each product manufactured by firms by dividing
the output elasticity of materials by the materials share of total revenue.4 Finally, we divide prices
by the markups to obtain marginal costs.
The estimation of the production function provides plausible results and highlights the impor-
tance of addressing the input price bias. We also observe that firms have lower markups and higher
marginal costs on products that are farther from their core competency, a finding consistent with
recent heterogeneous models of multi-product firms. Foreshadowing the impact of the trade liber-
alizations, we find that changes in marginal costs are not perfectly reflected in changes in prices
because of variable markups (i.e., incomplete pass-through).
Our main results focus on how prices, marginal costs, and markups adjust during India's trade
liberalization. As has been discussed extensively in earlier work, the nature of India's reform provides
an identification strategy that alleviates the standard endogeneity concerns associated with trade
liberalization. Perhaps not surprisingly, we observe price declines during the reform period, but
these declines appear modest relative to the size of the reform. On average, prices fall 18 percent
despite average output tariff declines of 62 percentage points. Marginal costs, however, decline on
average by 35 percent due primarily to input tariff liberalization; this finding is consistent with earlier
3Suppose a firm manufactures three products using raw materials, labor and capital. To our knowledge, no
dataset covering manufacturing firms reports information on how much of each input is used for each product. One
way around this problem is to assume input proportionality. For example, Foster et al. (2008) allocate inputs based on
products' revenue shares. Their approach is valid under perfect competition or the assumption of constant markups
across all products produced by a firm. While these assumptions may be appropriate for the particular homogenous
good industries they study, we study a broad class of differentiated products where these assumptions may not apply.
Moreover, our study aims to estimate markups without imposing such implicit assumptions.
4For multi-product firms, we use the estimated input allocations in the markup calculation.
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work demonstrating the importance of imported inputs in India's trade reform. The predominant
force driving down marginal costs are lower input tariffs reducing the costs of imported inputs,
rather than output tariffs reducing X-inefficiencies.5 Since our prices decompose exactly into their
underlying cost and markup components, we can show that the reason the relatively large decline
in marginal costs did not translate to equally large price declines was because markups increased:
on average, the trade reform raised relative markups by 17 percent. The results imply that firms
offset the cost declines from input tariff reductions by raising markups, and the net effect is that
the reform has an attenuated impact on prices. The increases in markups do not imply that the
trade reforms caused firms to collude or engage in less competitive behavior. Rather, the results
simply show that prices do not respond fully to cost, a finding that has been studied extensively in
the exchange rate literature and is consistent with any model with variable markups. Finally, we
observe that firms' ability to raise markups even further is mitigated by the pro-competitive impact
of output tariff declines, particularly for those firms with very high initial markups. Our analysis is
based on data representative of larger firms, so our results are representative of these larger firms.
Our results suggest that the most likely beneficiaries of the trade liberalization in the short-run
are domestic Indian firms who benefit from lower production costs while simultaneously raising
markups. The short-run gains to consumers appear small, especially considering that we observe
factory-gate prices rather than retail prices. However, the additional short-run profits accrued to
firms may have spurred innovation in Indian manufacturing, particularly in the introduction of
many new products, that benefit consumers in the long run. These new products accounted for
about a quarter of overall manufacturing growth (see Goldberg et al. (2010b)). In earlier work, we
showed that the new product introductions were concentrated in sectors with disproportionally large
input tariff declines that allowed firms access to new, previously unavailable imported materials (see
Goldberg et al. (2010a)). In the present paper, we find that firms with larger increases in average
markups were more likely to introduce new products, which suggests that higher profits may have
financed the development of new products that contributed to long run gains to consumers. A more
detailed investigation of this channel is beyond the scope of the present paper.
In addition to the papers discussed earlier, our work is related to a wave of recent papers
that focus on productivity in developing countries, such as Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) and
Hsieh and Klenow (2009). The low productivity in the developing world is often attributed to
lack of competition (see Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) and Bloom and Van Reenen (2010)) or the
presence of policy distortions that result in a misallocation of resources across firms (Hsieh and
Klenow (2009)). Against this background, it is natural to ask whether there is any evidence that an
increase in competition or a removal of distortions reduces production costs. India's reforms are an
excellent context to study these questions because of the nature of the reform and the availability
of detailed data. Trade protection is a policy distortion that distorts resource allocation. Limited
competition benefits some firms relative to others, and the high input tariffs are akin to the capital
5The relative importance of input and output tariffs is consistent with Amiti and Konings (2007) and Topalova
and Khandelwal (2011) who find that firm-level productivity changes in Indonesia and India, respectively, were
predominantly driven by input tariff declines.
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distortions examined by Hsieh and Klenow (2009). Our results suggest that the removal of barriers
on inputs lowered production costs, so the reforms did indeed deliver gains in the form of lower
production costs. However, the overall picture is more nuanced as firms do not appear to pass
the entirety of the cost savings to consumers in the form of lower prices. Our findings highlight
the importance of jointly studying changes in prices, markups and costs to understand the full
distributional consequences of trade liberalization.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief
overview of India's trade reform and the data used in the analysis. In Section 3 we lay out the
general empirical framework that allows us to estimate markups, and marginal costs. Section 3.1
presents the theoretical framework, Section 3.2 presents the empirical methodology to estimate the
production function and discusses identification, and Section 3.3 explains the process to recover
the allocation of inputs across products for multi-product firms. Section 4 presents the results and
Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and Trade Policy Background
We first describe the Indian data since it dictates our empirical methodology. We also describe key
elements of India's trade liberalization that are important for our identification strategy. Given
that the Indian trade liberalization has been described in a number of papers (including several by
a subset of the present authors), we keep the discussion of the reforms brief.
2.1 Production and Price data
We use the Prowess data that is collected by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE).
Prowess includes the usual set of variables typically found in firm-level production data, but has
important advantages over the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), India's manufacturing census.
First, unlike the repeated cross section in the ASI, Prowess is a panel that tracks firm performance
over time. Second, the data span India's trade liberalization from 1989-2003. Third, Prowess records
detailed product-level information for each firm. This enables us to distinguish between single-
product and multi-product firms, and track changes in firm scope over the sample period. Fourth,
Prowess collects information on quantity and sales for each reported product, so we can construct the
prices of each product a firm manufactures. These advantages make Prowess particularly well-suited
for understanding the mechanisms of firm-level adjustments in response to trade liberalizations that
are typically hidden in other data sources, and deal with measurement issues that arise in most
studies that estimate production functions.
Prowess enables us to track firms' product mix over time because Indian firms are required by
the 1956 Companies Act to disclose product-level information on capacities, production and sales
in their annual reports. As discussed extensively in Goldberg et al. (2010b), several features of the
database give us confidence in its quality. Product-level information is available for 85 percent of the
manufacturing firms, which collectively account for more than 90 percent of Prowess' manufacturing
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output and exports. Since product-level information and overall output are reported in separate
modules, we can cross check the consistency of the data. Product-level sales comprise 99 percent of
the (independently) reported manufacturing sales. We refer the reader to Appendix C and Goldberg
et al. (2010a,b) for a more detailed discussion of the data.
The definition of a product is based on the CMIE's internal product classification. There are
1,400 products in the sample for estimation.6 Table 1 reports basic summary statistics by two-
digit NIC (India's industrial classification system) sector. As a comparison, the U.S. data used
by Bernard et al. (2010), contain approximately 1,500 products, defined as five-digit SIC codes
across 455 four-digit SIC industries. Thus, our definition of a product is similar to earlier work
that has focused on the U.S. Table 2 provides a few examples of products available in our data
set. In our terminology, we will distinguish between sectors (which correspond to two-digit NIC
aggregates), industries (which correspond to four-digit NIC aggregates) and products (the finest
disaggregation we observe); we emphasize that since the product definition is available at a highly
disaggregated level, unit values are plausibly interpreted as prices in our application.
The data also have some disadvantages. Unlike Census data, the CMIE database is not well
suited for understanding firm entry and exit. However, Prowess contains mainly medium large
Indian firms, so entry and exit is not necessarily an important margin for understanding the process
of adjustment to increased openness within this subset of the manufacturing sector.7
We complement the production data with tariff rates from 1987 to 2001. The tariff data are
reported at the six-digit Harmonized System (HS) level and were compiled by Topalova (2010). We
pass the tariff data through India's input-output matrix for 1993-94 to construct input tariffs. We
concord the tariffs to India's national industrial classification (NIC) schedule developed by Debroy
and Santhanam (1993). Formally, input tariffs are defined as τ inputit =
∑
k akiτ
output
kt , where τ
output
kt
is the tariff on industry k at time t, and aki is the share of industry k in the value of industry i.
2.2 India's Trade Liberalization
A key advantage of our approach is that we examine the impact of openness by relying on changes
in trade costs induced by a large-scale trade liberalization. India's post-independence development
strategy was one of national self-sufficiency and heavy government regulation of the economy. India's
trade regime was amongst the most restrictive in Asia, with high nominal tariffs and non-tariff
barriers. In response to a balance-of-payments crisis, India launched a dramatic liberalization of
the economy as part of an IMF structural adjustment program in August 1991. An important
part of this reform was to abandon the extremely restrictive trade policies it had pursued since
independence.
Several features of the trade reform are crucial to our study. First, the external crisis of 1991,
6We have fewer products than in Goldberg et al. (2010b) because we require non-missing values for quantities
and revenues rather than just a count of products, and drop small sectors that do not have enough observations to
implement the methodology.
7Firms in Prowess account for 60 to 70 percent of the economic activity in the organized industrial sector and
comprise 75 percent of corporate taxes and 95 percent of excise duty collected by the Government of India (CMIE).
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which came as a surprise, opened the way for market oriented reforms (Hasan et al. (2007)).8 The
liberalization of the trade policy was therefore unanticipated by firms in India and not foreseen
in their decisions prior to the reform. Moreover, reforms were passed quickly as sort of a shock
therapy with little debate or analysis to avoid the inevitable political opposition (see Goyal (1996)).
Industries with the highest tariffs received the largest tariff cuts implying that both the average and
standard deviation of tariffs across industries fell.
While there was significant variation in the tariff changes across industries, Topalova and Khan-
delwal (2011) show that tariff changes through 1997 were uncorrelated with pre-reform firm and
industry characteristics such as productivity, size, output growth during the 1980s and capital in-
tensity. The tariff liberalization does not appear to have been targeted towards specific industries
and appears relatively free of usual political economy pressures until 1997 (which coincides with an
election that changed political power). We estimate the production function and markups on the
full sample, but restrict our analysis of the trade reform to the 1989-1997 period when trade policy
did not respond to pre-existing industry- or firm-level trends. We again refer the reader to previous
publications that have used this trade reform for a detailed discussion (Topalova and Khandelwal
(2011); Topalova (2010); Sivadasan (2009); Goldberg et al. (2010a,b)).
3 Methodology: Recovering Markups and Marginal Costs
This section describes the framework to estimate markups and marginal costs using product- and
firm-level production data. Section 3.1 presents the theoretical framework and explicitly states the
assumptions required to implement the approach. The computation of markups and marginal costs
requires estimates of production function coefficients and information about the allocation of inputs
across products. Section 3.2 describes the methodology to estimate the production function and
identification. Once the production function parameters are estimated, Section 3.3 explains how we
recover the allocation of inputs across products for multi-product firms. In section 3.4 we discuss
how we compute markups and marginal costs. Section 3.5 comments on the assumptions required
to implement our methodology.
3.1 Theoretical Framework
Consider a production function for a firm f producing a product j at time t:
Qfjt = Fjt(Vfjt,Kfjt)Ωft (1)
where Q is physical output, V is a vector of variable inputs that the firm can freely adjust andK is
a vector of fixed inputs that face adjustment costs. The firm's productivity is denoted Ωft. A firm
8Some commentators (e.g., Panagariya (2008)) noted that once the balance of payments crisis ensued, market-
based reforms were inevitable. While the general direction of the reforms may have been anticipated, the precise
changes in tariffs were not. Our empirical strategy accounts for this shift in broad anticipation of the reforms, but
exploits variation in the sizes of the tariff cuts across industries.
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produces a discrete number of products Jft. Collect the inputs into a vector X = {V,K}. Let
W vfjt denote the price of a variable input v and W
k
fjt denote the price of a dynamic input k, with
v = {1, ..., V } and k = {1, ...,K}.
We begin by characterizing conceptual assumptions necessary to estimate markups and marginal
costs for multi-product firms. We refer to these assumptions as conceptual because they are indepen-
dent of the particular data and setting. Implementing the approach requires additional assumptions
dictated by particular features of our data and our focus on India's trade reforms (e.g., functional
form and identification assumptions), and we describe these in the next section. The approach
requires the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: The production technology is product-specific. Our notation reflects
this assumption. The production function F (.) is indexed by product j. This assumption implies
that a single-product firm and a multi-product firm that produce the same product have the same
production technology, although their productivities Ωft might differ.
Assumption 2: Fjt(.) is continuous and twice differentiable w.r.t. at least one element
of Vfjt, and this element of Vfjt is a static (i.e., freely adjustable or variable) input in
the production of product j. This assumption restricts the technology so that the firm can
adjust its output quantity by changing a particular variable input.9 Furthermore, this assumption
implies that firm cost minimization involves at least one static first order condition with respect to
a variable input of production.
Assumption 3: Hicks-neutral productivity Ωft is log-additive and firm-specific. This
assumption implies that a multi-product firm has the same productivity Ωft in the production of all
its products.10 This assumption follows the tradition of modeling productivity in the multi-product
firm literature in this manner (e.g., Bernard et al. (2011)). For single-product firms, this assumption
is of course redundant.
Assumption 4: Expenditures on all variable and fixed inputs are attributable to
products. This assumption implies that we can always write the expenditure on input X at-
tributable to product j as WXfjtXfjt = ρ˜fjt
∑
j
(
WXfjtXfjt
)
where WXfjt is the price for input X
with X ∈ X, and ρ˜fjt is the share of input expenditures attributable to product j with the re-
striction that
∑
j ρ˜fjt = 1. Note that ρ˜fjt is not observed in the data. Assumption 4 allows for
economies (or diseconomies) of scope in costs of production; we discuss this distinction below in
Section 3.5.
9Assumption 2 rules out a fixed proportion technology (e.g., Leontief) in all variable inputs. The assumption
seems reasonable at the level of aggregation of our data. We observe total labor, capital and intermediate inputs
at the firm level, and so there is ample room for firms to substitute, say, workers for capital while keeping output
constant.
10In principle, we can allow for Fjt(Vfjt,Kfjt,Ωfjt) to derive a theoretical expression for markups. However,
assumption 3 is required to estimate markups for multi-product firms.
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Assumption 5: The state variables of the firm are
sft = {Jft,Kf,j=1,t, ...,Kf,Jft,t,Ωft,Gf , rfjt}
The state variables include the number of products produced (Jft), the dynamic inputs for all
products (Kfjt), productivity (Ωft), location information (Gf ), and all payoff relevant serially
correlated variables, such as tariffs and the firm's export status (EXPft), which we collect in rfjt.
Assumption 6: Firms minimize short-run costs taking output quantity and in-
put prices Wfjt at time t as given. Firms face a vector of variable input prices W
v
fjt =
W vt (νfjt,Gf ,afjt−1), which depends on the quality νfjt of product j, exogenous factors Gf (e.g.,
geography), and firm/product-level actions afjt−1 taken prior to time t. The latter can capture
pre-negotiated input prices through contracts, for example, as long as the contracts do not specify
input prices as a function of input quantities. The important assumption is that a firm's variable
input price does not depend on input quantity. This assumption rules out static sources of market
power in input markets. We discuss this assumption in more detail at the end of this subsection.
We consider the firm's cost minimization problem conditioning on state variables. From as-
sumptions 2 and 6, firms minimize costs with respect to variable inputs. Assumptions 4 and 6
imply that costs are separable across products since a firm's product mix is a dynamic choice and
pre-determined at time t when variable inputs are chosen. Hence, we can minimize costs product-
by-product for multi-product firms.
The associated Lagrangian function for any product j at time t is:
L(Vfjt,Kfjt, λfjt) =
V∑
v=1
W vfjtV
v
fjt +
K∑
k=1
W kfjtK
k
fjt
+λfjt [Qfjt −Qfjt(Vfjt,Kfjt,Ωft)] (2)
The first order condition for any variable input V v used on product j, is
∂Lfjt
∂V vfjt
= W vfjt − λfjt
∂Qfjt(.)
∂V vfjt
= 0, (3)
where the marginal cost of production at a given level of output is λfjt since
∂Lfjt
∂Qfjt
= λfjt. Rear-
ranging terms and multiplying both sides by
Vfjt
Qfjt
, provides the following expression:
∂Qfjt(.)
∂V vfjt
V vfjt
Qfjt
=
1
λfjt
W vfjtV
v
fjt
Qfjt
. (4)
The left-hand side of the above equation represents the elasticity of output with respect to variable
input V vfjt (the output elasticity). Define the markup µfjt as µfjt ≡ Pfjtλfjt .
This cost-minimization condition can be rearranged to express the markup for each product j
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as:
µfjt = θ
v
fjt
(
PfjtQfjt
W vfjtV
v
fjt
)
= θvfjt(α
v
fjt)
−1 (5)
where θvfjt denotes the output elasticity on variable input V
v and αvfjt is the share of expenditure
on input V v allocated to product j in the total sales of product j. This expression forms the basis
for our approach to compute markups. To compute the markup, we need the output elasticity on
V v for product j, and the share of the input's expenditure allocated to product j in the total sales
of product j, αvfjt.
The expression for the markup in (5) looks similar to the one derived in De Loecker and Warzyn-
ski (2012) with one crucial difference: all variables are indexed by j. This seemingly small distinction
has significant ramifications for the analysis and precludes us from using the existing approach in
De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) to obtain the subcomponents of (5). De Loecker and Warzynski
(2012) focus on firm-level markups and implement the conventional production function methodol-
ogy using revenue data. Because of their focus and data, they do not need to confront the challenges
posed by multi-product firms. Specifically, the firm-specific expenditures shares are directly observed
in their data and the output elasticity is obtained by estimating a firm-level production function
using deflated revenues. In contrast, our framework utilizes product-specific information on quan-
tities and prices. This forces us to conduct the analysis at the product-level because aggregation to
the firm-level is not possible without an explicit model of market demand.
The focus on products rather than firms calls for an explicit treatment of multi-product firms.
In a multi-product setting, both components in equation (5) are unobserved. In contrast to a
single-product firm setting, we must estimate the output elasticity separately for each product
manufactured by each firm. Furthermore, the product-specific input expenditure shares αvfjt cannot
be calculated from the data because firms do not report the input expenditure allocations ρ˜fjt.
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Our framework, presented below, confronts these two challenges by proposing a methodology for
estimating production functions that explicitly deals with multi-product firms and allows one to
impute the input expenditure allocations across the products of a multi-product firm.
An additional advantage of focusing on products rather than firms is that once we derive esti-
mates of product-level markups, we can calculate marginal costs using information on product-level
prices, which are observed directly in the data:
mcfjt =
Pfjt
µfjt
. (6)
A brief discussion of the assumptions underlying the analysis is in order. Assumptions 1-5 have
been explicitly or implicitly assumed throughout the literature estimating production functions.12
For example, Assumption 1 is made implicitly whenever researchers pool single- and multi-product
firm data to estimate production functions, which is almost always the case. The only difference is
11We are unaware of any data set that provides this information for all inputs.
12See Ackerberg et al. (2006) for an overview of this literature.
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that the standard approach uses firm-level deflated sales and expenditure data; this practice does
not force the researcher to confront multi-product firms in the data since the analysis is conducted at
the firm level. Our framework strictly nests this approach, but since we use price data, and because
prices are only defined at the product level (unless one is willing to make additional assumptions on
demand that will allow aggregation to the firm level), we must specify physical production functions
at the product level. We therefore explicitly state the assumptions that underlie the treatment of
multi-product firms (Assumptions 1, 3 and 4).
Variants of Assumption 4 have been invoked in the few studies that have addressed the price bias
in production function estimation (e.g., Foster et al. (2008) and De Loecker (2011)). Foster et al.
(2008) allocate input expenditures according to revenue shares, while De Loecker (2011) allocates
them based on the number of products. These variants are considerably stronger than, and are
strictly nested within, Assumption 4. Relaxing these input allocation assumptions is one of the
methodological contributions of this paper.
The product-by-product short-run cost minimization with respect to variable inputs in (2) fol-
lows from Assumptions 2, 4 and 6. Assumption 2 assures the existence of a variable input and is
essential for our approach. If all inputs are dynamic, we can still estimate the production function,
but we cannot derive markups using the approach we described above. However, the assumption
that there is at least one factor of production that the firm can freely adjust over the period of a
year (we have annual production data) is both plausible and standard in empirical work.
Our framework allows for economies (or diseconomies) of scope. While physical synergies in
production are ruled out by Assumption 1, other forms of economies (or diseconomies) of scope
are consistent with Assumptions 1 and 4. Economies of scope can operate through the Hicks-
neutral productivity shocks Ωft, by spreading of the fixed costs associated with dynamic inputs
(e.g., capital) across multiple products13, and/or through pre-negotiated firm-level contracts for
input prices W vfjt, as long as these input prices do not depend on quantity of inputs. We discuss
economies of scope in more detail in Section 3.5.
Finally, an important assumption we maintain throughout the analysis is that input prices do
not depend on input quantities (Assumption 6). While restrictive, this assumption is more general
than the one employed in almost all production function studies, in which it is assumed that all
firms face the same input prices (in contrast, we allow for input prices to differ across firms because
of locational differences and/or quality differentiation). If firms have monopsony power in input
markets, Assumption 6 will be violated. In this case, one can show that our approach will tend
to understate the level of markups. However, the approach can still be used to trace and explain
changes in markups, as long as there are no contemporaneous changes in firms' monopsony power,
or, even if there are such changes, as long as changes in firms' monopsony power are uncorrelated
with trade policy changes. Appendix D provides a detailed discussion of the conditions under which
our approach is valid in the case of monopsony power.14
13That is, J−1ft
∑
jW
k
fjtKfjt falls as the number of products increases.
14In principle, one could make the argument that trade policy might lead to exit of smaller, less productive firms,
which might give monopsony power to the remaining firms in the market. In practice, we do not observe firm exit in
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In sum, our approach to recover estimates of markups and marginal costs requires estimates
of the parameters of the production function Fjt(.) at the product level and the input allocations
ρ˜fjt across products within each multi-product firm. Section 3.2 discusses the production function
estimation method and the identification strategy we employ in order to obtain the output elasticities
for both single- and multi-product firms.
3.2 Estimation
We take logs of equation (1) and allow for log-additive measurement error and/or unanticipated
shocks to output (fjt). Log output is given by: qfjt = ln (Qfjt exp (fjt)) . Letting xfjt be the
vector of (log) physical inputs, xfjt = {vfjt,kfjt}, and ωft be ln(Ωft), we obtain:
qfjt = fjt(xfjt;β) + ωft + fjt. (7)
By writing the production function in terms of physical output rather than revenue, we exploit
separate information on quantities and prices that are available in the data. The use of physical
output in equation (7) eliminates concerns of a price bias that arises if output is constructed by
deflating firm revenues by an industry-level price index.15
Unobserved productivity ωft potentially leads to well known simultaneity and selection biases.
These two biases have been the predominant focus of the production function estimating literature
and we follow the insights of Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), and Ackerberg
et al. (2006) in addressing them. Note that if we theoretically had data on the physical inputs
(vfjt,kfjt) for all products, these existing approaches to estimating production functions would in
principle suffice to obtain consistent estimates of the production function coefficients β.
In reality, no dataset records product-specific inputs, so estimating equation (7) requires dealing
with two additional issues: (a) we do not observe input allocations across products in multi-product
firms; and (b) we observe industry-wide deflated firm-level input expenditures rather than firm-level
input quantities. The latter is not merely a measurement problem because firms typically rely on
differentiated inputs to manufacture differentiated products, so physical input and output are not
readily comparable across firms.
To understand the implications of these two issues for estimation, let x˜ft denote the (observed)
vector of deflated input expenditures, deflated by a sector-specific price index. From Assumption
4, product-level input quantities, xfjt, for each input x relate to firm-level expenditures as follows:
xfjt = ρfjt + x˜ft − wxfjt (8)
where ρfjt = ln ρ˜fjt is the (log) share of firm input expenditures allocated to product j and w
x
fjt de-
our sample, so we do not consider such a scenario as a likely explanation for our empirical results. We have explored
heterogeneity in our results by identifying business groups in our sample who may have some degree of monopsony
power, but we do not find differential effects with respect to the impacts of tariffs on their prices, markups and
marginal costs (results available upon request).
15For a detailed discussion, see De Loecker (2011) and Foster et al. (2008).
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notes the deviation of the unobserved (log) firm-product-specific input price from the (log) industry-
wide input price index.16 By substituting this expression for physical inputs into equation (7) and
defining wfjt as the vector of log firm-product-specific input prices, we obtain:
17
qfjt = fjt(x˜ft;β) +At(ρfjt, x˜ft,β) +Bt(wfjt, ρfjt, x˜ft,β) + ωft + fjt (9)
Compared to equation (7), there are two additional unobserved terms in (9). First, the term
At(.) that arises from the unobserved product-level input allocations ρfjt and second, the term Bt(.)
that captures unobserved firm-product-specific input prices wfjt. The exact form of terms A(.) and
Bt(.) depends on the functional form of f(.). Both terms depend on the vector of coefficients β, the
input expenditures x˜ft, and the unobserved product-level input allocation shares ρfjt. It is evident
from (9) that even after controlling for the unobserved productivity ωft using standard estimation
techniques, the presence of the terms A(.) and B(.) leads to biased production function coefficients
since both terms are correlated with the deflated input expenditures x˜ft. We refer to the bias arising
from the term A(.) as the input allocation bias and the bias arising from B(.) as the input price
bias. The methodology we develop in this subsection addresses these biases.
Neither the input allocation nor the input price bias have received much attention in the
literature on production function estimation to date because the standard practice regresses deflated
sales on deflated expenditures at the firm level.18 De Loecker and Goldberg (2014) discuss the
conditions under which these biases interact so as to produce reasonable estimates. But although
such estimates may look plausible, this does not imply that the coefficients are consistent estimates
of the production function. Failing to correct these biases traces the elasticity of sales with respect
to input expenditures, but that elasticity is not useful in our approach because equation (5) requires
the elasticity of output quantities with respect to input quantities.
To deal with these biases, we proceed in four steps. Subsection 3.2.1 explains how the estimation
addresses the unobserved input allocation bias. Subsection 3.2.2 explains how to address the bias
arising from unobserved input prices. Subsection 3.2.3 explains our treatment of the unobserved
productivity shock and selection correction. Subsection 3.2.4 explains the moment conditions and
further elaborates on identification and estimation. The first two steps are new to the literature on
production function estimation; the last two steps build on existing work.
16We allow for multi-product firms to face different input prices in the production of their various products.
Accordingly, the input prices w are indexed by both f and j. This would be the case if a multi-product firm
manufactured products of different qualities that relied on inputs of different qualities; see subsection 3.2.2 for a
discussion of the relationship between output and input quality.
17To simplify notation, we will always use wfjt to denote the deviations of firm-product-specific input prices from
industry input price indexes. Similarly, from now on, we will use the term firm input prices to denote firm-specific
deviations from industry averages.
18Katayama et al. (2009) is the only study to our knowledge that acknowledges the existence of the input price
bias
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3.2.1 Unobserved Input Allocations: The Use of Single-Product Firms
Assumptions 1 and 4 imply that a firm f 's technology used to produce product j is independent
of the other products manufactured by the firm. This also implies that a multi-product firm uses
the same technology as a single-product firm producing the same product.19 We can therefore rely
on single-product firms to estimate the product-level production function in (9), without having to
address the unobserved input allocations in multi-product firms. For single-product firms, A(·) = 0
because by definition, ρ˜fjt = 1. Since estimation is based on the single-product sample, we omit
the product subscript j for the remainder of the exposition of the estimation algorithm.
Equation (9) simplifies to:
qft = ft(x˜ft;β) +Bt(wft, x˜ft,β) + ωft + ft. (10)
The approach of using the single-product firm estimates to infer the production function coef-
ficients for all firms raises the concern that the estimates may suffer from a selection bias since we
rely only on single-product firms in the estimation. The selection bias arises if firms' choice to add a
second product and become multi-product depends on the unobserved firm productivity ωft and/or
firms' input use. Our estimation procedure utilizes the selection correction insights from Olley and
Pakes (1996) to address this potential selection bias in two ways. First, we use an unbalanced panel
that consists of firms that are single-product at a given point in time. At time t, the unbalanced
panel includes both firms who always remain single-product firms and those that manufacture a
single product at t but add additional products at a later date. This feature of the sample is impor-
tant since many firms start off as single-product firms and add products during our sample. The
use of the unbalanced panel fully addresses the non-random event that a firm becomes a multi-
product producer based on unobserved productivity ωft.
20 Second, to account for the possibility
that the productivity threshold determining the transition of a firm from single- to multi-product
status is correlated with production inputs (in particular, capital), we additionally apply a sample
selection correction procedure. We describe the details of the sample selection correction procedure
in subsection 3.2.3.21
As the notation in (10) indicates, it is in principle possible to estimate separate production
functions by year. In practice, our sample is not large enough to allow for time-varying production
functions. Therefore, the production function we take to the data is not indexed by t. We consider
19For example, imagine a single-product firm produces a t-shirt using a particular technology, and another single-
product firm produces carpets using a different combination of inputs. We assume that a multi-product firm that
manufactures both products will use each technology on its respective product, rather than some third technology.
20This non-random event of adding a second product results in a sample selection issue analogous to the non-
random exit of firms discussed in Olley and Pakes (1996). In their context, Olley and Pakes (1996) are concerned
about the left tail of the productivity distribution; here, a balanced panel of single-product firms would censor the
right tail of the productivity distribution. The use of the unbalanced panel of single-product firms improves upon
this selection problem.
21Firms in our sample very rarely drop products, so we do not observe the reverse transition from multi- to single-
product status. We refer the reader to Goldberg et al. (2010b) for a detailed analysis of product adding and dropping
in our data. Unlike Olley and Pakes (1996), we are also not concerned with firm exit. Firm exit is rare in our data
because Prowess covers the medium and large firms in India.
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three inputs in the (deflated) input expenditure vector x˜ft: labor (l˜), intermediate inputs (m˜) and
capital (k˜). It is clear from equation (10) that we still need to correct for the term related to unob-
served firm-specific input price variation, B(wft, x˜ft,β) and the unobserved firm-level productivity
(ωft) in order to obtain consistent estimates of the production function parameters β, and hence
the output elasticities that are used to compute markups and marginal costs. We turn to these
issues next.
3.2.2 Unobserved Input Prices
The treatment of unobserved input prices is important for two reasons. First, we need to control for
them in B(wft, x˜ft,β) in equation (10) to recover consistent estimates of the production function
parameters β.22 Second, the input demand equation that is used to control for productivity ωft
naturally depends on input prices (see next subsection 3.2.3).
In our framework (see Assumption 6), firm-specific input price variation can arise through ex-
ogenous variation in input prices across local input markets (Gf ) and/or variation in input quality
(νft).
23 This implies that two firms in the same industry that produce in the same location only
face the exact same input prices if they buy the exact same input quality. We propose an approach
to control for unobserved input price variation across firms using information on observables, par-
ticularly (but not exclusively) output prices. The intuition is that output prices contain information
about input prices. For example, using data from Colombia that uniquely record price informa-
tion for both inputs and outputs, Kugler and Verhoogen (2011) document that producers of more
expensive products also use more expensive inputs.
We provide a formal model that rationalizes our approach to control for input prices in Appendix
A. We show that in a large class of models of consumer demand and imperfect competition used in
the Industrial Organization and International Trade literatures, we can proxy for unobserved input
prices using a function of the firm's output price, market share, and product dummies. Here, we
sketch the main argument and provide the economic intuition underlying our empirical strategy.
The main premise is that manufacturing high quality products requires high quality inputs,
and that high quality inputs are expensive. We further assume complementarity in input quality:
manufacturing high quality products requires combining high quality materials with high quality
labor and capital. This is a common assumption in the literature and underlies `O-Ring'-type
theories of production (e.g., Kremer (1993), Verhoogen (2008) and Kugler and Verhoogen (2011)).
This complementarity implies that the prices of all inputs facing a firm can be expressed as a
function of a single index of product quality. Appendix A shows that input prices are an increasing
function of product quality in this setting. Accordingly, we can control for input price variation
across firms using differences in output quality across firms.
22This subsection considers single-product firms since we use only these firms to estimate the production functions,
but all relationships described below also apply to multi-product firms (in which case all relevant variables should be
indexed by j).
23We abstract from lagged action variables aft−1, since we do not have rich enough data to measure these (e.g.,
past contracts specifying input prices independent of quantities).
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Given that input prices are an increasing function of input quality, which is an increasing function
of output quality, we can use the variables proxying for output quality (i.e., output price, market
share and product dummies) to proxy for input prices. Formally, we write input prices wxft as a
function of output quality νft and firm location Gf :
24
wxft = wt(νft,Gf ). (11)
This expression for input prices generalizes Assumption 6 to all inputs. Under the assumption
of input quality complementarity, the unobserved input price variation across all inputs can be
captured by a single control function.
Using the results from Appendix A we get:
wxft = wt(pft,msft,Df ,Gf , EXPft), (12)
where pft is the output price of the firm, msft is a vector of market shares, Df captures the
vector of product dummies, and EXPft denotes the export status of a firm.
25 It is important to
note that our approach to control for unobserved input quality does not assume that products are
only vertically differentiated. It allows for horizontal differentiation, but horizontal differentiation is
costless. In contrast, differentiation along the vertical dimension requires higher quality inputs that
have higher input prices. This assumption is common in trade models (e.g., Verhoogen (2008) and
Khandelwal (2010)). Moreover, because we model output quality as a flexible function of output
prices, market share, and product dummies, the approach does not commit to a particular demand
function since it encompasses a large class of demand models used in the literature. For example,
in a purely vertical differentiation model, there is a one-to-one mapping between product quality
and product prices, so output prices perfectly proxy for quality; in this case, one would not require
controls for market share or product characteristics. In the simple logit model, quality is a function
of output prices and market shares (see Khandelwal (2010) for a detailed exposition). In more
general models, such as the nested logit or random coefficients models, quality is a function of
additional variables, such as product characteristics, conditional market shares, etc. While product
characteristics usually cannot be observed in firm-level data, product dummies accommodate these
more general demand specifications as in Berry (1994). Finally, using output prices as a proxy
for quality does not imply that we assume complete pass-through of input to output prices; the
degree of pass-through is dictated by the (unspecified) underlying demand and market structure
and by the firm behavioral assumptions. Accordingly, the approach is consistent with any degree
of pass-through between input and output prices.
24We remind the reader that we have defined the input price wxft for input x as the deviation of the actual input
price from the relevant input price index (i.e., the weighted industry mean), and therefore wxft = 0 for the producer
paying exactly the (weighted) average w¯xt . Formally w
x
fjt = w
x∗
fjt − w¯xjt, where ∗ denotes the actual input price faced
by firm f for its product j at time t.
25We include the export status of a firm to allow for market demand conditions to differ from the domestic market.
In our data we do not observe the product-destination trade flows for each firm. Otherwise this information could be
included here.
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The final step is to substitute the input price control function from (12) into the expression for
wft in B(wft, x˜ft,β) in equation (10), we get:
B(wft, x˜ft,β) = B((pft,msft,Df ,Gf , EXPft)× x˜cft;β, δ) (13)
A few words on notation are in order. The function B(.) is different from the input price
function w(.) as described in equation (12). The function B(.) depends on the input prices wft and
will therefore take as arguments the elements of w(.). However, it also contains interactions of the
input prices (wft) with the vector of deflated input expenditures x˜ft. We use the notation x˜
c
ft to
highlight the fact that the input price term w(.) enters also by itself, without being interacted with
the input expenditures x˜ft, and thus we include a constant term: x˜
c
ft = {1, x˜ft}. The notation
highlights that the use of the input price control function requires us to estimate an additional
parameter vector δ alongside the production function parameters β .
3.2.3 Unobserved Productivity and Selection Correction
The only remaining source of potential bias in (10) is the unobserved firm-level productivity ωft.
Firms' choices of inputs and number of products are in part affected by this (to the econometrician)
unobserved productivity, potentially leading to simultaneity and selection bias in estimation. We
control for unobserved productivity ωft in (10) using a control function based on a static input
demand equation. In addition, we implement a selection correction for the potential selection bias
stemming from the use of single-product firms in the estimation procedure, discussed in subsection
3.2.1. We describe both procedures here.
We follow the literature on production function estimation, as initiated by Olley and Pakes
(1996) and extended by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), and control for unobserved productivity ωft
in (10) using a static input demand equation. The materials demand function in our setting will
take as arguments all state variables of the firm noted in Assumption 5, including productivity, and
all additional variables that affect a firm's demand for materials. These include firm location (Gf ),
output prices (pft), product dummies (Df ), market shares (msft), input prices (wt(.)), the export
status of a firm (EXPft) and the input (τ
input
it ) and output tariffs (τ
output
it ) that the firm faces on
the product it produces. From (12) input prices are themselves a function of output price, market
share and product dummies26, so materials demand is given by:
m˜ft = mt(ωft, k˜ft, l˜ft,Gf , pft,Df ,msft, EXPft, τ
input
it , τ
output
it ). (14)
We collect all the variables determining intermediate input demand, except for the input ex-
penditures and unobserved productivity, in zft = {Gf , pft,Df ,msft, EXPft, τ inputit , τoutputit }. The
number of products (Jft) is omitted from the set of state variables since the sample we use for
26Note that we consider (log) intermediate input expenditure, defined as the sum (in logs) of the intermediate input
demand and the input price. This implies that the materials expenditure function m˜t(.) takes as arguments the same
variables as the physical materials demand function mt(.): mft = mt(w
m
ft, .) and m˜ft = mt(.) + w
m
ft = m˜t(w
m
ft, .),
where wmft is the input price.
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estimation contains only single-product firms. The subscript i on the tariff variables denotes an
industry to indicate that tariffs vary at a higher level of aggregation than products. Inverting (14)
gives our control function for productivity:27
ωft = ht(x˜ft, zft). (15)
Our approach also encompasses a selection correction to address the potential selection bias
stemming from the use of only single-product firms in the estimation discussed in subsection 3.2.1.
The selection bias arises if a firm's choice to add a second product and become a multi-product firm
depends on unobserved firm productivity ωft in equation (10) and/or the firm's input use. Following
Olley and Pakes (1996), who address the selection bias due to plant exit in their setting, we model
the probability that a firm continues to produce one product non-parametrically as a function of
the firm's productivity forecast and all state variables sft.
The underlying model behind our sample selection correction is one where the number of prod-
ucts manufactured by firms increases with productivity. Several multi-product firm models generate
this correlation, with Mayer et al. (2014) matching our setup most closely. In that model, the num-
ber of products a firm produces is an increasing step function of the firms' productivity. Firms have
a productivity draw which determines their core product. Conditional on entry, the firm produces
this core product and incurs an increasingly higher marginal cost of production for each additional
product it manufactures. This structure generates a competence ladder that is characterized by a
set of cutoff points, each associated with the introduction of an additional product.28
The cutoff point relevant to our sample selection procedure is the one associated with the
introduction of a second product. We denote this cutoff by ω¯ft. Firms with productivity that
exceeds ω¯ft are multi-product firms that produce two (or more) products while firms below ω¯ft
remain single-product producers and are included in the estimation sample.
If the threshold ω¯ft is independent of the right-hand side variables in the production function in
equation (10), there is no selection bias and we obtain consistent estimates of production function
coefficients (as long as we use the unbalanced panel of single product firms, i.e., the sample of firms
that are single-product at any point in time, but may become multi-product in the future). A bias
arises when the threshold is a function of capital and/or labor. For example, it is possible that even
conditional on productivity, a firm with more capital finds it easier to finance the introduction of
27As discussed in Olley and Pakes (1996), the proxy approach does not require knowledge of the market structure
for the input markets; it simply states that input demand depends on the firm's state variables and variables affecting
input demand. By using a static control to proxy for productivity, we do not have to revisit the underlying dynamic
model and prove invertibility when modifying Olley and Pakes (1996) for our setting to include additional state
variables (e.g., tariffs). See De Loecker (2011) and Ackerberg et al. (2006) for an extensive discussion. A recent
literature has discussed alternative estimation procedures that do not rely on this inversion. In the absence of
shocks to output ft, this can be accomplished without any extra assumptions. However, these shocks end up being
important, especially when estimating physical output production functions where they absorb unit fixed effects.
28Alternative models such as Bernard et al. (2010) introduce firm-product-specific demand shocks that generate
product switching (e.g., product addition and dropping) in each period. We avoid this additional complexity since
product dropping is not a prominent feature of our data (Goldberg et al. (2010b)). Moreover, in Section 4 we find
strong support that firms' marginal costs are lower on their core competent products (products that have higher sales
shares).
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an additional product; or, a firm that employs more workers may have an easier time expanding
into new product lines. In these cases, firms with more capital and/or labor are less likely to be
single-product firms, even conditional on productivity, and this generates a negative bias in the
capital and labor coefficients.
To address the selection bias, we allow the threshold ω¯ft to be a function of the state variables
sft and the firm's information set at time It−1 (we assume the decision to add a product is made in
the previous period). The selection rule requires that the firm make its decision to add a product
based on a forecast of these variables in the future. Define an indicator function χft to be equal to
1 if the firm remains single-product (SP) and 0 otherwise. The selection rule can be written as:
Pr(χft = 1) = Pr [ωft ≤ ω¯ft(sft)|ω¯ft(sft), ωft−1] (16)
= κt−1(ω¯ft(sft), ωft−1)
= κt−1(x˜ft−1, ift−1, zft−1) (17)
≡ SPft
Note that the variables included in z are a subset of the state variables that appear in s (the
latter include the dynamic inputs that are part of x˜). We use the fact that the threshold at t
is predicted using the firm's state variables at t − 1, the accumulation equation for capital, and
ωft = ht(x˜ft, zft) from equation (15) to arrive at the last equation.
29 As in Olley and Pakes (1996),
we have two different indexes of firm heterogeneity, the productivity and the productivity cutoff
point. Note that SPft = κt−1(ωft−1, ω¯ft) and therefore ω¯ft = κ−1t−1(ωft−1, SPft).
3.2.4 Productivity Process, Moment Conditions, and Identification
To estimate the parameter vectors β and δ, we follow Ackerberg et al. (2006) and form moments
based on the innovation in the productivity shock ξft. We consider the following law of motion for
productivity:
ωft = g(ωft−1, τ
output
it−1 , τ
input
it−1 , EXPft−1, SPft) + ξft. (18)
The tariff variables and export dummy are included in the law of motion to account for the
fact that trade policy and exporting may affect productivity. As De Loecker (2013) shows, if one
expects these variables to have an effect on productivity, then the theoretically consistent treatment
is to include them directly in the law of motion. Otherwise, their omission may lead to biased
production function coefficients. Of course, the fact that these variables are allowed to have an
impact on productivity does not mean that they will in fact have an effect. It is entirely possible
that the empirical estimates indicate that the trade variables have no effect on productivity. Hence,
including trade variables in the law of motion does not assume a particular result regarding the
29The accumulation equation for capital is: Kft = (1− δ)Kft−1 + Ift−1, where δ is the depreciation rate of capital.
This specification takes into account that firms hire and/or fire workers based on their labor force at time t− 1 and
their forecast of future demand and costs captured by z and ω. So all variables entering the nonparametric function
κt−1(.) help predict the firm's employment at time t.
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effects of tariffs or exporting on productivity.
Trade related variables are expected to affect productivity both through exporting and importing
channels. For example, a large literature suggests learning by exporting effects. Likewise, trade
economists have postulated that a reduction in output tariffs that exposes firms to intensified import
competition may lead to reduction in X-inefficiencies and adoption of better management practices.
In this case, output tariff reductions may lead to productivity improvements. On the input side,
input tariff reductions may lead to the import of new, previously unavailable intermediate products,
which will lead to increases in productivity (see Halpern et al. (2011) for a formalization of this
argument). We emphasize that the specification we adopt for the law of motion for productivity in
equation (18) allows for these mechanisms to generate productivity improvements, but by no means
assumes the result. The inclusion of the probability that a firm remains single-product in the next
period SPft in the law of motion addresses the selection correction from equation (16).
To form moments based on the innovation in the productivity shock in (18), one needs to express
the productivity ωft as a function of data and parameters. Plugging the expressions for the input
price correction from (13) and for unobserved productivity from (15) into the production function
equation (10), we get:
qft = φt(x˜ft, zft) + ft, (19)
Estimation of (19) enables one to get rid of unanticipated shocks and/or measurement error ft.
We note that although the variables proxying for input prices (see equation (12)) also enter the input
demand equation in equation (15), this has no implications for the identification of the production
function parameters. The only purpose of the first stage estimation is to purge the output quantity
data from unanticipated shocks and/or measurement error (i.e., purge ft in equation (10)).
30 For
example, output prices (pft) enter this first stage both to control for unobserved productivity and
input price differences, but we do not need to distinguish between them when forecasting output.
Note that even if we observed (quality-corrected) input prices, we would still include output prices
and the function φt(.) would reflect this.
The first stage of the estimation in (19) yields an estimate of predicted output φˆft.
31 One can
then express productivity ωft as a function of data and parameters. In particular, using equations
(10), (13) and (19) we have:
ωft(β, δ) = φˆft − f(x˜ft;β)−B((pft,msft,Df ,Gf , EXPft)× x˜cft; δ), (20)
where the last term, the function B(.), represents the input price control function.32
30We could set ft = 0; in this case, we no longer need to invert the input demand function to control for unobserved
productivity. However, we feel that the input demand specification addresses first-order empirical issues with the
data: measurement error in output and differences in units across products within sectors, which are absorbed by
unit fixed effects in the first stage.
31In practice we approximate the function φt(.) with a third-order polynomial in all its elements, with the exception
of product dummies. We add the product dummies linearly to avoid having to estimate all cross terms. This seems
innocuous since the first stage R2 is very close to one.
32We approximate B(.) with a flexible third-order polynomial. At this point the reader might find it useful to
consider a special case of a Cobb-Douglas production function and a vertical differentiation model of consumer
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It is important to note that even though the input expenditures x˜ft enter both the production
function f(.) and the input price control function B(.), the coefficients of the production function β
are identified because x˜ft enter the input price control function in (13) only interacted with input
prices, or put differently, the input expenditures do not enter the input price function w(.) in (12).
This identification insight does not rest on any functional form assumptions; it results from the fact
that the control function for quality, and hence input prices, rests on the demand side alone and
hence does not include input expenditures.
The main parameters of interest to compute markups are the vector of production function
coefficients β. However, from (13), note that the parameter vector δ allows us to identify the input
prices: after we have estimated β and δ, we can recover the input prices from equation (12).33
To estimate the parameter vectors β and δ, we form moments based on the innovation in the
productivity shock ξft in law of motion in equation (18). We use (20) to project ωft(.) on the
elements of g(.) to obtain the innovation ξft as a function of the parameters ξft(β, δ):
ξft(β, δ) = ωft(β, δ)− E
(
ωft(β, δ)|ωft−1(β, δ), τoutputit−1 , τ inputit−1 , EXPft−1, SPft
)
(21)
The moments that identify the parameters are:
E (ξft(β, δ)Yft) = 0, (22)
where Yft contains lagged materials, current capital and labor, and their higher order and interaction
terms, as well as lagged output prices, lagged market shares, lagged tariffs, and their appropriate
interactions with the inputs.
This method identifies the production function coefficients by exploiting the fact that current
shocks to productivity will immediately affect a firm's materials choice while labor and capital do
not immediately respond to these shocks; moreover, the degree of adjustment can vary across firms
and time. These moments that rely on adjustment costs in inputs are by now standard in this
literature. In our context, we assume that firms freely adjust materials and treat capital and labor
as dynamic inputs that face adjustment costs. In other settings, one may choose to treat labor as
a flexible input. Since materials are the flexible input, we use lagged materials when we construct
moments.34
We use lagged output prices, market shares, and tariffs and their interactions with appropriately
lagged inputs to form additional moment conditions to identify jointly the production function
coefficients β and the coefficients δ capturing the input price variation. For example, the parameter
related to the output price is identified off the moment E(ξtpt−1) = 0; this moment condition is
based on the insight that current prices do react to productivity shocks, so we need to use lagged
demand. In this special case equation (20) reduces to: ωft(β, δ) = φft − x˜′ftβ − Γwt(pft; δ), where Γ denotes the
returns to scale parameter. Please see Appendix B for details.
33In other words, we specify the function w(.) and therefore the δ parameters are a function of both the production
function coefficients β , and the parameters in w(.).
34In our setting, input tariffs are serially correlated and since they affect input prices, input prices are serially
correlated over time, creating a link between current and lagged intermediate input usage.
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output prices which exploit the serial correlation of prices.
We estimate the model using a GMM procedure on a sample of firms that manufacture a single
product for at least three consecutive years.35 We choose three years since the moment conditions
require at least two years of data because of the lagged values; we add an additional (third) year
to allow for potential measurement error in the precise timing of a new product introduction. We
discuss the timing assumptions further in subsection 3.5.2. In principle, one could run the estimation
separately for each product. In practice, our sample size is too small to allow estimation at the
product level, so we estimate (10) at the two-digit sector level.36
Estimation of equation (10) requires choosing a functional form for f . We adopt a translog spec-
ification because of its flexibility.37 Specifically, the translog offers the advantage that it generates
output elasticities that are not constant over time and across firms (though the production coeffi-
cients are constrained to be the same across years and firms); hence, large firms can have different
elasticities than small firms. The exact functional form for f(.) does not generate any identification
results. The crucial assumption is that productivity enters in a log-additive fashion (Assumption 3
in Section 3.1).
Finally, the standard errors on the coefficients are obtained using block-bootstrapping, where
we draw an entire firm time series. Since our ultimate objective is to estimate the impact of the
trade reforms on markups and marginal costs, we correct the standard errors of the regressions in
Section 4 by block-bootstrapping over our entire empirical procedure.
3.3 Recovering Input Allocations
As shown in equations (5) and (6), computing markups and marginal costs requires the product-
specific output elasticity and product-specific revenue shares on a variable input (in our case, mate-
rials). We obtain the output elasticity from the estimation outlined in Section 3.2 based on single-
product firms, but we do not know the product-specific revenue shares of inputs for multi-product
firms. Here, we show how to compute the input allocations across products of a multi-product firm
in order to construct αMfjt.
From Assumption 6, recall that ρfjt = ln
(
WXfjtXfjt
X˜ft
)
∀X ∈ {V,K}, is product j's input cost
share. We solve for ρfjt in multi-product firms as follows. We first eliminate unanticipated shocks
and measurement error from the product-level output data by following the same procedure as in
the first stage of our estimation routine for the single-product firms in (19). We project qfjt on the
exact same variables used in the first stage of the estimation procedure, q̂fjt ≡ E (qfjt|φt (x˜ft, zft)),
which allows us to eliminate any measurement error and unanticipated shocks to output from the
recorded output data.
35We follow the procedure suggested by Wooldridge (2009) that forms moments on the joint error term (ξft + ft).
36This follows the standard practice in the literature where production functions are estimated at the industry
level. For example, see Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
37The translog production function is qft = βllft + βlll
2
ft + βkkft + βkkk
2
ft + βmmft + βmmm
2
ft + βlklftkft +
βlmlftmft + βmkmftkft + βlmklftmftkft + ωft.
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Given the aforementioned assumptions that productivity is firm-specific and log-additive and
that inputs are divisible across products, we can rewrite the production function as:
q̂fjt = f(x˜ft, βˆ, ŵfjt, ρfjt) + ωft, and recover
{
{ρfjt}Jj=1 , ωft
}
using:
q̂fjt − f1(x˜ft, βˆ, ŵfjt) = f2(x˜ft, ŵfjt, ρfjt) + ωft (23)∑
j
exp (ρfjt) = 1, (24)
where f1 and f2 depend on the functional form of the production function and the input prices ŵfjt
for each product j are computed based on the input price function (12). In other words, to recover
the input allocations ρfjt, we separate the production function into a component f1 that captures
all terms that do not depend on ρfjt and a component f2 that collects all terms that involve ρfjt.
Because the input allocation shares have to sum up to 1 across all products in a multi-product firm,
this yields a system of Jft + 1 equations (where Jft is the number of products produced by firm f
at time t) in Jft + 1 unknowns (the Jft input allocations ρfjt and ωft) for each firm-year pair.
Let ω̂fjt = q̂fjt − f1(x˜ft, βˆ, wft). Applying our translog functional form to (23), we obtain:
ω̂fjt = ωft + aˆfjtρfjt + bˆfjtρ
2
fjt + cˆfjtρ
3
fjt (25)
The terms aˆft, bˆft, and cˆft are functions of the estimated parameter vector βˆ and the estimated
input price correction ŵfjt.
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For each year, we obtain the firm's productivity and input allocations, the J + 1 unknowns
(ωft, ρf1t, . . . , ρfJt), by solving a system of J + 1 equations:
ω̂f1t = ωft + aˆf1tρf1t + bˆf1tρ
2
f1t + cˆf1tρ
3
f1t (26)
. . . (27)
ω̂fJtt = ωft + aˆfJttρfJtt + bˆfJttρ
2
fJtt + cˆfJttρ
3
fJtt (28)
J∑
j=1
exp (ρfjt) = 1, exp (ρfjt) ≤ 1 ∀fjt (29)
This system imposes the economic restriction that each input share can never exceed one and
they must together sum up to one across products in a firm. We numerically solve this system for
each firm in each year.
38For the translog, these terms are
aˆft = βˆk + βˆl + 3wˆ
2
fjtβˆlmk + l˜ft
(
βˆlk + 2βˆll + βˆlm + k˜ftβˆlmk + m˜ftβˆlmk − 2wˆfjtβˆlmk
)
+ βˆm + k˜ft
(
2βˆkk + βˆlk + m˜ftβˆlmk
)
+k˜ft
(
−2wˆfjtβˆlmk + βˆmk
)
+ wˆfjt
(
−2βˆkk − 2βˆlk − 2βˆll − 2βˆlm − 2βˆmk − 2βˆmm
)
+ m˜ft
(
βˆlm − 2wˆfjtβˆlmk + βˆmk + 2βˆmm
)
bˆft = βˆkk + βˆlk + βˆll + βˆlm + βˆlmkk˜ft + βˆlmk l˜ft + βˆlmkm˜ft − 3wˆfjtβˆlmk + βˆmk + βˆmm
cˆft = βˆlmk
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3.4 Markups and Marginal Costs
We can now apply our framework to compute markups and marginal costs using the estimates of
the production function coefficients (β) and the input allocations (ρ). We calculate the markup for
each product-firm pair f, j in each time period t using:
µˆfjt = θˆ
M
fjt
PfjtQfjt
exp(ρˆfjt)X˜
M
ft
, (30)
where θˆMfjt = θ(βˆ, x˜ft, ŵfj , ρˆfjt) and X˜
M
ft denotes the firm's expenditure on materials.
The product-specific output elasticity for materials θˆMfjt is a function of the production function
coefficients and the materials allocated to product j . Hence, it can be easily computed once the
allocation of inputs across products has been recovered.39Marginal costs mcfjt are then recovered
by dividing price by the relevant markup according to equation (6).
Note that both markups and marginal costs are estimates since they depend on the estimated
production function coefficients and the input cost allocation parameters, which are estimates them-
selves since they depend on the production function coefficients. Hence, the only source of uncer-
tainty in our markup (and marginal cost) estimates comes from using estimated coefficients (the
production function coefficients βˆ and the input price correction coefficients δˆ). We account for
the measurement error in these variables when we estimate the reduced form regressions in Sec-
tion 4 by bootstrapping over the entire procedure. We execute the following steps in sequence: 1)
estimate the production function, 2) recover the input allocations, 3) calculate markups (marginal
costs), and 4) project markups and costs on trade policy variables. We then repeat this procedure
500 times, using bootstrapped (with replacement) samples that keep the sample size equal to the
original sample size. This allows us to compute the bootstrapped standard error on the trade policy
coefficients in Section 4.
3.5 Discussion
In addition to the conceptual assumptions discussed in Section 3.1, the actual implementation of
the approach requires a set of assumptions to accommodate limitations of the data. Some of these
limitations are specific to our data set (for example, we do not have information on physical labor
units and wages, but only the wage bill) and may be of little general relevance. But other limitations
are present in every firm-level data set and will need to be addressed by any study using such data.
To our knowledge, no dataset reports the allocation of input expenditures across products in multi-
product firms or contains the complete information on the firm-specific input prices (including
firm-specific price of capital). The additional assumptions we impose are needed in order to deal
with these features of the data. Apart from measurement issues, the assumptions we employ also
address challenges that arise from product differentiation.
39The expression for the materials output elasticity for product j at time t is: θ̂Mfjt = βˆm + 2βˆmmmfjt + βˆlmlfjt +
βˆmkkfjt + βˆlmklfjtkfjt. As before, to obtain the physical inputs, we rely on our estimates of the input prices ŵfjt
and the input allocation shares ρˆfjt .
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In this section we discuss these additional assumptions and our identification strategy. We start
by discussing the way we deal with the unobserved input allocations in multi-product firms.
3.5.1 The Use of Single-Product Firms: Economies of Scope and Relationship to Cost
Function Estimation
This subsection expands on the discussion of economies of scope in our setting and relates it to
discussion of economies of scope in the cost function literature. Our approach does not rule out
economies (or diseconomies) of scope, which may be important for multi-product firms. Panzar
(1989) defines economies of scope in terms of cost. Baumol et al. (1983) speak of economies of scope
in production if the cost function is sub-additive: cft (q1, q2) ≤ cft(q1) + cft(q2) where cft(.) is a
firm's cost curve. While our framework rules out differences in the production technology between
single- and multi-product firms, it allows for economies of scope through cost synergies. The main
sources of such economies are the possibility that multi-product firms have higher Hicks-neutral
productivity than single-product firms (potentially because of differences in management practices
or organizational structures) and the multiproduct firms' ability to spread their fixed costs across
multiple products.
An alternative way of explaining the assumptions underlying our approach is to express them
in terms of the cost function rather than the production function. A multi-product firm faces the
short-run cost function, written in a general form as:
C(Q) = Φ(Ω)C(Q,W,β) + F (ι(Q)) (31)
where C denotes the total costs for a firm producing a vector of outputs Q, Φ(Ω) denotes the impact
of factor-neutral productivity on costs, W denotes a vector of input prices, F are the fixed costs
(which would be zero in long-run cost function), and ι(.) is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if a
firm produces a particular product in the vectorQ and is zero otherwise. The assumption we impose
is that the function C (Q,W,β) is the same across single- and multi-product firms. However, costs
between the two types of firms can still differ because of: 1) factor-neutral productivity differences
reflected in Φ(Ω); 2) (in the short run) the amortization of fixed costs F across more products for
multi-product firms. A third possibility is that factor prices W differ across the two types of firms
because of pre-negotiated contracts; such differences are consistent with our assumptions regarding
input prices as long as the contracts do not specify input prices as a function of input quantity.
We emphasize that we allow for economies of scope rather than assuming it. For example, our
results could find no productivity differences between single- and multi-product firms, or find that
multi-product firms are less productive implying diseconomies of scope. Likewise, finding economies
of scope in the range of our data does not imply existence of economies of scope over any range
of products produced by a firm; it is possible that economies of scope switch to diseconomies once
a firm reaches a certain number of products. This paper does not attempt to provide a theory of
multi-product firms. We simply point out that our approach does not a priori rule out economies
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or diseconomies of scope in the range of our data.
The representation of the cost function in (31) raises the natural question of why we do not
exploit the duality between production and cost function and estimate a multi-product cost func-
tion. The main reason for focusing on the production function is that we do not have information
on wages and the firm-specific user cost of capital, which are required to estimate a cost function.
Furthermore, a multi-product cost function estimation would require additional identification as-
sumptions in order to deal with the endogeneity of multiple product outputs on the right-hand side.
Finally, even if one could come up with such identification assumptions, the product portfolios in
our particular context are not stable. While Indian firms very rarely drop products, they often
add products during this period (see Goldberg et al. (2010b)). These frequent additions require
explicitly modeling a firm's decision to add a particular product (in contrast, our approach requires
us to model only the change from single- to multi-product status). Given these challenges, the ap-
proach to estimate production functions from single-product firms while accounting for the potential
selection bias is an appealing alternative.
3.5.2 Control Function for Input Prices and Timing Assumptions
This subsection explains how the control function for input prices, the law of motion for productivity
and the timing assumptions allow us to identify the coefficients. Recall that the identification
strategy involves two control functions for the two unobservables: input prices and productivity:
wft = wt(pft,msft,Df ,Gf , EXPft) (32)
ωft = g(ωft−1, τ
output
it−1 , τ
input
it−1 , EXPft−1, SPft) + ξft. (33)
While ωft enters the production function (10) linearly, the input prices enter non-linearly as
part of the term B(.). By substituting the input price control function into the expression for w,
we get equation (13).
First, note that we make use of the input price control function in the first stage of the estimation,
when we purge the data from the noise . At this stage, we use materials as a proxy for productivity.
Given that materials demand depends on input prices, it is important to control for the input prices
using the control function specified above. However, the first stage has no implications for the
identification of the production function coefficients; its sole purpose is to net out .
Next, consider the identification of the production function coefficients β and the coefficients
associated with the input price correction term δ. These are identified off our timing assumptions.
To review these assumptions, we assume that materials are a freely adjustable input and hence they
will be correlated with contemporaneous productivity. Similarly, output prices will be correlated
with current productivity. In contrast, capital and labor are dynamic inputs. Therefore, they will
be uncorrelated with the productivity innovation ξft. We rely on these assumptions to form moment
conditions.
There are two remaining identification issues that need to be discussed. First, as we noted earlier,
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the term B(.) will in general include input expenditures x˜ft. This raises the question of whether
the production coefficients β are identified. They are identified because the input expenditures x˜ft
enter the input price term B(.) only through interaction with the input prices. It is because of the
complexity of the translog that x˜ft appear in B(.) through interactions with input prices. In a
Cobb-Douglas specification, the input expenditures do not appear in B(.). In fact, under a constant
returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function the input correction term B(.) simplifies to
w(.).40
The second question is how the coefficients on variables that enter both the law of motion for
productivity and the input price control function are identified. One example of such a variable is
the export dummy. The law of motion for productivity includes a dummy for exporting in t − 1,
while it is also included in the input price control. The answer is that these coefficients are again
identified off timing assumptions. We assume that productivity responds with a lag to changes
in a firm's environment, since it plausibly takes time for a firm to take the actions required to
increase its efficiency (e.g., hiring better managers, adopting better management practices, changing
organizational structure, importing new intermediate inputs, etc.). Accordingly, variables that may
influence a firm's productivity, such as tariffs or exporting, enter with a lag in the law of motion of
productivity. In contrast, output and input prices respond immediately to changes in the economic
environment. Accordingly, the variables included in the input price control function enter with
their current values. As noted earlier, it is precisely because these variables enter with their current
values that we face an identification problem; the current values will be correlated with ξft since
by assumption they respond to contemporaneous shocks. It is this potential correlation that leads
us to form moment conditions based on the lags, and not the current values, of the corresponding
variables (the vector Yft contains lagged output prices, lagged market shares, etc.).
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Output Elasticities, Marginal Costs and Markups
In this subsection, we present the output elasticities recovered from the production function esti-
mation procedure. We describe how failing to correct for input price variation or account for the
selection bias affects the parameters. Finally, we present and discuss our markup and marginal cost
estimates.
The output elasticities are reported in Table 3.41 The nice feature of the translog is that unlike in
a Cobb-Douglas production function, output elasticities can vary across firms (and across products
within firms). We report both the average and standard deviation of the elasticities across sectors,
and the final column reports the returns to scale. We note that a few sectors appear to have low
returns to scale, but these are driven by outliers; Table 4 reports median output elasticities which
40See Appendix B for details of the special case of Cobb-Douglas.
41The output elasticity for capital and labor are defined analogous to the materials elasticity reported in Footnote
39.
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are generally larger than the averages. Since the returns to scale vary across firms, it is possible for
many firms in a sector to have increasing returns to scale, while the estimate of the industry-average
returns to scale is close to one. At the firm level, 70 percent of the sample exhibits increasing returns
to scale.
The left panel of Table 5 repeats the production function estimation without implementing the
correction for the unobserved input price variation discussed in subsection 3.2.2. The uncorrected
procedure yields nonsensical estimates of the production function. For example, the output elas-
ticities and returns to scale are sometimes negative, very low or very high. These results are to
be expected given that we estimate a quantity-based production function using deflated input ex-
penditures, i.e., we relate physical output to input expenditures. It is clear that failing to account
for input price variation yields distorted estimates. To understand the source of the distortion,
consider the following concrete example from our data: in 1995, Ashnoor Textile Mills and Delight
Handicrafts Palace sold 71,910 and 67,000,000 carpets, respectively. Ashnoor, however, had about
three times higher input expenditures and three times higher revenues. It is easiest to understand
the implications of this example for the estimates using a Cobb-Douglas specification. A quantity
production function estimation that ignores input price variation would result in very large and
negative output elasticities (more input expenditures result in lower quantity for Ashnoor). In the
more general translog specification, it is impossible to sign this bias because there are three inputs
which interact in complicated ways with each other and input prices, but it is clear that one needs
to correct for input price variation across firms. By introducing the input price control, we are ef-
fectively comparing output quantities to input quantities, and the resulting output elasticities then
look reasonable.
The importance of the input price correction is not apparent in the earlier literature, which
traditionally estimates a Cobb-Douglas specification of the form: q+ p = x˜β+ ω˜. This specification
relates deflated sales to deflated expenditures and implies that w˜ = w + p − w(.). That is, the
unobserved productivity measure includes both (unobserved) output price p and (unobserved) input
prices w. If one does not control for either output or input price variation (the typical practice in
this literature until recently), there is no apparent problem as the two price biases tend to work in
opposite directions.42 This leads to output elasticities that appear plausible without immediately
calling for a correction.43 Of course, this does not mean that the two biases exactly cancel each
other, so the final estimates will generally still be biased.
The right panel of Table 5 presents the mean output elasticities from an estimation of the
production function that does not include the sample selection correction described in Section 3.2.3.
The coefficients change slightly when the selection correction is not implemented. The stability of
the coefficient estimates with and without selection correction for the unbalanced panel suggests
that the use of the unbalanced panel of single-product firms (which includes firms that are always
42See De Loecker and Goldberg (2014) for a detailed discussion of this issue.
43In fact, when we estimate a firm-level revenue-based production function using the standard control function
approach, we obtain production function coefficients that look similar to the previous literature (results available
upon request).
29
single-product and firms that ultimately transition to a multi-product status) likely alleviates most
of the concerns about the selection bias. This is consistent with the findings in Olley and Pakes
(1996).
The markups are reported in Table 6. The mean and median markups are 2.24 and 1.18,
respectively, but there is considerable variation across sectors and across products and firms within
sectors. Some firms report markups below one for individual products, but multi-product firms
maximize profits across products, so they may lose money on some products while being profitable
on others. To get a better sense of the plausibility of our estimates, we aggregate the product-
level markups to the firm level using the share of sales as weights. The firm-level markups are
below one for only about 15 percent of the sample and the median firm-level markup is 1.43. In
fact, we find a strong positive (and statistically significant) relationship between firm markups and
reported accounting profits, measured as operating profits divided by total sales (results available
upon request). Importantly, for our main results below, we rely on changes in markups over time
by exploiting variation within firm-product pairs rather than variation in levels across firms.
The methodology provides measures of markups and marginal costs without a priori assumptions
on the returns to scale. The estimates show that many firms are characterized by increasing returns
to scale, so we expect to observe an inverse relationship between a product's marginal cost and
quantity produced. Accordingly, another way to assess the plausibility of the measures is to plot
marginal costs against production quantities in Figure 1 (we de-mean each variable by product-year
fixed effects in order to facilitate comparisons across firms). The figure shows indeed that marginal
costs vary inversely with production quantities. The left panel of the figure shows that quantities
and markups are positively related indicating that firms producing more output also enjoy higher
markups (due to their lower marginal costs).
We also examine how markups and marginal costs vary across products within a firm. Our anal-
ysis here is guided by the recent literature on multi-product firms. Our correlations are remarkably
consistent with the predictions of this literature, especially with those of Eckel and Neary (2010) and
the multi-product firm extension of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) developed by Mayer et al. (2014).
A key assumption in these models is that multi-product firms each have a core competency. The
core product has the lowest (within a firm) marginal cost. For the other products, marginal costs
rise with a product's distance from the core competency. Mayer et al. (2014) assume a linear de-
mand system which implies that firms have non-constant markups across products. Furthermore,
firms have their highest markups on their core products with markups declining as they move
away from their main product. Figure 2 provides evidence supporting these implications. They plot
the de-meaned markups and marginal costs against the sales share of the product within each firm
(markups and marginal costs are de-meaned by product-year and firm-year fixed effects in order to
make these variables comparable across products within firms). Marginal costs rise as a firm moves
away from its core competency while the markups fall. In other words, the firm's most profitable
product (excluding any product-specific fixed costs) is its core product. Despite not imposing any
assumptions on the market structure and demand system in our estimation, these correlations are
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remarkably consistent with the predictions from the multi-product firm literature.
4.2 Pass-Through
Foreshadowing the results in the next subsection, we also find evidence of imperfect pass-through of
costs on prices because of variable markups. This subsection explains how we estimate pass-through.
Consider the identity that decomposes the (log) price of a firm f producing product j into its
two subcomponents: (log) marginal cost, lnmcfjt, and (log) markup, lnµfjt:
lnPfjt = lnmcfjt + lnµfjt (34)
This identity can also be written as:
lnPfjt = lnµfj + lnmcfjt + (lnµfjt − lnµfj) (35)
where lnµfj is the (time-invariant) average (log) markup for this particular firm-product pair and
(lnµfjt − lnµfj) is the deviation of the markup from its average. If markups are constant, then
the last term becomes zero. This is the case of complete pass-through: a proportional change in
marginal cost is passed entirely to prices. If markups are variable, then marginal costs are correlated
with the term in parenthesis and pass-through is incomplete. For example, if the price elasticity of
demand is increasing in price, then an increase in marginal cost (which will tend to raise the price)
will lead to an increase in the price elasticity of demand and a decrease in the markup. In this case,
the marginal cost is negatively correlated with the (variable) markup and the pass-through of a
marginal cost change onto price is below one. This correlation between marginal costs and markups
is not an econometric issue since the equation above is an identity. Rather, it is a correlation
dictated by economic theory: any model that implies variable markups will also imply a correlation
between marginal cost and markup and result in incomplete pass-through.
To understand the implications of variable markups and incomplete pass-through in our setting,
first consider the hypothetical case where marginal cost can be measured exactly. Suppose we run
the following pass-through regression:
lnPfjt = afj + ζ lnmcfjt + εfjt (36)
where afj is a firm-product fixed effect. In this setup, the error term εfjt has a structural interpreta-
tion. It reflects the deviation of the actual markup in period t from the average (i.e., it corresponds
to (lnµfjt − lnµfj)) .
If markups are constant, then we would expect to find that ζ = 1 and εfjt = 0 (i.e., an exact fit).
The firm-product fixed effect afj would accurately measure the constant markup and the coefficient
ζ would measure the pass-through of marginal cost to price which would be complete (ζ = 1). The
deviation of the actual markup from the average, εfjt, would be zero if markups were constant. Of
course, in reality we would never get an exact fit of the regression line. But as long as εfjt captures
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random variation in price (due for example to recording errors) that is orthogonal to the marginal
cost, we would estimate complete pass-through.
If markups are variable, then the error term εfjt will be correlated with the marginal cost
lnmcfjt.
44 We again emphasize that this correlation is dictated by theory and not by econometrics.
If the price elasticity facing the firm is increasing in price, then a marginal cost increase will lead to
a price increase, which will raise the price elasticity and lower the markup. Hence, εfjt and lnmcfjt
will be negatively correlated and the pass-through coefficient ζ will be below one. This is the case
of incomplete pass-through.
When observing marginal cost, the coefficient ζ reflects markup variability and pass-through.
There would be no need to instrument for marginal costs. In fact, instrumenting marginal costs is
conceptually incorrect because the correlation between marginal costs and the structural error of the
regression (i.e., the markup) is precisely what the coefficient ζ is supposed to capture. However, in
our application (and almost every other empirical study), we only observe an estimate of marginal
cost, ln m̂cfjt = lnmcfjt + σfjt. The pass-through regression becomes
lnPfjt = afj + ζ ln m̂cfjt + (εfjt − ζσfjt) = afj + ζ ln m̂cfjt + ufjt (37)
Measurement error results in a downward bias in the pass-through coefficient ζ leading us to con-
clude, potentially erroneously, that pass-through is incomplete. We therefore require instruments
to address measurement error in marginal costs. It is important to note that in this setting, instru-
ments must be uncorrelated with the measurement error, σfjt. However, we do not require that
they are uncorrelated with the part of the error term that reflects the deviation in markup, εfjt.
Indeed, such a condition would be inconsistent with the exercise which is precisely to measure the
correlation between marginal cost and markup, that is the correlation between m̂cfjt and εfjt.
We instrument for marginal cost in equation (37) with input tariffs and lagged marginal cost.
Both variables are certainly correlated with marginal cost. The former should be uncorrelated with
the measurement error in our marginal cost estimate, but input tariffs do not vary at the firm level.
The advantage of lagged marginal cost is that it varies at the firm-product-year level. Although
lagged marginal costs contain measurement error, we have no reason to expect this measurement
error to be serially correlated.
Table 7 presents the pass-through results from estimating (37).45 OLS results are reported in
column 1, and the coefficient is 0.360. The second column instruments marginal costs with both
lagged marginal cost and input tariffs, and consistent with measurement error, the IV estimate
increases. The coefficient rises to 0.427 and is statistically significant. In case one is concerned
about first-order serial correlation in measurement error, the third column uses input tariffs and
two-period lagged marginal cost as the instruments, and the IV estimate is now 0.572. Thus, the
results seem robust to the use of alternative instruments and consistently point to low pass-through.
44Variable markups can be generated in many different ways through various combinations of market structure,
firm behavior and demand function. See Goldberg and Hellerstein (2013) for a discussion.
45As noted in Section 3.4, we report bootstrap standard errors.
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This imperfect pass-through means that shocks to marginal costs, for example shocks from trade
liberalization, do not lead to proportional changes in factory-gate prices because of changes in
markups. We examine this markup adjustment in detail in the subsequent section.
4.3 Prices, Markups and Trade Liberalization
We now examine how prices, markups and marginal costs adjusted as India liberalized its economy.
As discussed in Section 2, we restrict the analysis to 1989-1997 since tariff movements after this
period appear correlated with industry characteristics.
We begin by plotting the distribution of raw prices in 1989 and 1997 in Figure 3. Here, we
include only firm-product pairs that are present in both years, and we compare the prices over time
by regressing them on firm-product pair fixed effects and year dummies and plotting the residuals.
As before, we remove outliers in the bottom and top 3rd percentiles. This comparison of the same
firm-product pairs over time exploits the same variation as our regression analysis below. The figure
shows that the distribution of (real) prices did not change much between 1989 and 1997. This might
at first be a surprising result given nature of India's economic reforms during this period that were
designed to reduce entry barriers and increase competition in the manufacturing sector. As a first
pass, the figure suggests that prices did not move much despite the reforms.
Of course, the figure includes only firm-product pairs that are present at the beginning and end
of the sample, and summarizes aggregate trends, thereby not controlling for sector-specific factors
that could influence prices beyond the trade reforms. We use the entire sample and control for
macroeconomic trends in the following specification:46
pfjt = λfj + λst + λ1τ
output
it + ηfjt. (38)
We exploit variation in prices and output tariffs within a firm-product over time through the firm-
product fixed effects (λfj) and control for macroeconomic fluctuations through sector-year fixed
effects λst. Since the trade policy measure varies at the industry level, we cluster our standard
errors at this level.47 We report the price regression with just year fixed effects in column 1 of Table
8. The coefficient on the output tariff is positive implying that a 10 percentage point decline is
associated with a small1.29 percentdecline in prices.48 Between 1989 and 1997, output tariffs fall
on average by 62 percentage points; this results in a precisely estimated average price decline of 8
percent (=62*0.129). This is a small effect of the trade reform on prices and it is consistent with
the raw distributions plotted in Figure 3. The basic message remains the same if we control more
flexibly for trends with sector-year fixed effects in column 2. The results imply that the average
46One could try to capture the net impact of tariff reforms using the effective rate of protection measure proposed
by Corden (1966). However, this measure is derived in a setting with perfect competition and an infinite export-
demand and import-supply elasticities which imply perfect pass-through. As we show below, these assumptions are
not satisfied in our setting, so that the concept of the effective rate of protection is not well defined in our case.
47Recall from Section 2 that tariffs vary at a 4-digit level, while sector is defined as a 2-digit industry.
48Our result is consistent with Topalova (2010) who finds that a 10 percentage point decline in output tariffs results
in a 0.96 percent decline in wholesale prices in India during this period.
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decline in output tariffs led to a 10 (=62*.161) percent relative drop in prices.
These results show that although the trade liberalization led to lower factory-gate prices, the
decline is more modest than we would have expected given the magnitude of the tariff declines.
Since earlier studies (Goldberg et al. (2010a), Topalova and Khandelwal (2011)) have emphasized
the importance of declines in input tariffs in shaping firm performance, we separate the effects of
output tariffs and input tariffs on prices. Output tariff liberalization reflects primarily an increase
in competition, while the input tariff liberalization should provide access to lower cost (and more
variety of) inputs. We run the analog of the regression in (38), but separately include input and
output tariffs:
pfjt = λfj + λst + λ1τ
output
it + λ2τ
input
it + ηfjt. (39)
The results are shown in column 1 of Table 9.49 There are two interesting findings that are important
for understanding how trade affects prices in this liberalization episode. First, there is a positive
and statistically significant coefficient on output tariffs. This result is consistent with the common
intuition that increases in competitive pressures through lower output tariffs will lead to price
declines. The effect is traditionally attributed to reductions in markups and/or reductions in X-
inefficiencies within the firm. The point estimates imply that a 10 percentage point decline in
output tariffs results in a 1.49 percent decline in prices. On the other hand, the coefficient on input
tariffs is small and noisy. Holding input tariffs fixed and reducing output tariffs, we would observe
a precisely estimated decline in prices. Overall, average output tariffs and input tariffs fall by 62
and 24 percentage points, respectively, and using the point estimates in column 1, this implies that
prices fall on average by 18.1 percent (a decline that is statistically significant).
We use the estimates of markups and costs to examine the mechanisms behind these moderate
changes in factory-gate prices. We begin by plotting the distribution of markups and costs in
Figure 4. Like Figure 3, this figure considers only firm-product pairs that appear in both 1989
and 1997. The figure indicates that between 1989 and 1997, the marginal cost distribution shifted
left indicating an efficiency gain. However, this marginal cost decline is offset by a corresponding
rightward shift in the markup distribution. Since (log) marginal costs and (log) markups exactly sum
to (log) prices, the net effect results in little changes to prices. Hence, the raw data point towards
imperfect pass-through of cost declines to prices. As before, these patterns are only suggestive and
presented only for illustrative purposes, given that the figures do not condition on the policy and
other changes that took place over this period.
We re-run specification (39) using marginal costs and markups as the dependent variables to
formally analyze these relationships. Since prices decompose exactly to the sum of marginal costs
and markups, the coefficients in columns 2 and 3 sum to their respective coefficients in column 1
in Table 9. We first focus on marginal costs regressions reported in column 2. The coefficient on
49The regressions exclude outliers in the top and bottom 3rd percent of the markup distribution. We trim to ensure
that the results are not driven by outliers. Nevertheless, the results are robust (e.g., magnitudes change slightly but
statistical significance is unaffected) to alternative trims (e..g, the top and bottom 1st) and to not trimming at all
(results are available upon request).
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output tariffs is statistically insignificant, suggesting that marginal costs are insensitive to output
tariff liberalization. However, the coefficient on input tariffs is both positive and large in magnitude.
This is strong evidence that improved access to cheaper and more variety of imported inputs results
in large cost declines. The final row of Table 9 reports the average effect on marginal costs using
the average declines in input and output tariffs. On average, marginal costs fell 35.2 percent.
This magnitude of the marginal costs decline is sizable and would translate to larger prices
declines if markups are constant. However, Figure 4 suggests that markups rose during this period,
and in column 3 of Table 9, we directly examine how input and output tariffs affected markups. The
coefficient on input tariffs is large and negative implying that input tariff liberalization resulted in
higher markups. The results indicate that firms offset the beneficial cost reductions from improved
access to imported inputs by raising markups. The overall effect, taking into account the average
declines in input and output tariffs between 1989 and 1997, is that markups, on average, increased
by 17.0 percent. This increase offsets about half of the average decline in marginal costs, and as a
result, the overall effect of the trade reform on prices is moderated.50
Although tempting, it is misleading to draw conclusions about the pro-competitive effects of
the trade reform from the markup regressions in column 3 of Table 9. The reason is that one
needs to control for impacts of output tariff liberalization on marginal costs in order to isolate pro-
competitive effects. For example, if output tariffs affect costs through changes in X-inefficiencies,
firms may adjust markups in response to these cost changes. The simultaneous effects that tariffs
have on both costs and markups make it difficult to identify pro-competitive effects of the reform
based on specification in column 3.
To isolate pro-competitive effects, we need to control for simultaneous shocks to marginal costs.
We do this by re-running the markup regression but controlling flexibly for marginal costs. Condi-
tioning on marginal costs, the output tariff coefficient isolates the direct pro-competitive effect of
the trade liberalization on markups. We report the results in Table 10.51 Indeed, the coefficient
on output tariffs in column 1 is positive and significant; this provides direct evidence that output
tariff liberalization exerted pro-competitive effects on markups. The way to interpret the results in
column 1 is to consider the markups on two products in different industries. Conditional on any
(potentially differential) impact of the trade reforms on their respective costs, the product in the in-
dustry that experiences a 10 percentage point larger decline in output tariffs will have a 1.25 percent
relative decline in markups.52 Column 2 instruments marginal costs to account for measurement
error (see discussion in Section 4.2) with input tariffs and a second-order polynomial in lag marginal
costs, and the coefficient declines but remains statistically significant. This analysis demonstrates
50These results are robust to controlling for other contemporaneous policy changes in India, e.g., delicensing (results
available upon request).
51To control for marginal costs as flexibly as possible, we use a second-order polynomial for marginal costs and
suppress these coefficients in Table 10. We find very similar results if we simply include marginal costs as the only
control (results are available upon request).
52In unreported results, we include input tariffs in the regression. As discussed earlier, input tariffs should affect
markups only through the imperfect transmission of their impact on costs through improved access to imported
inputs. Once we control for marginal costs, input tariffs should have no effect on markups and that is what we find.
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that although India's trade reform led to large cost reductions leading firms to respond by raising
markups. Once we control for these cost effects, output tariff reductions do exert pro-competitive
effects by putting downward pressure on markups.
The pro-competitive effects might differ across products. For example, output tariffs may exert
more pressure on products with high markups prior to the reform. We explore this heterogeneity
by creating a time-invariant indicator for firm-product pairs in the top decile of their industry's
markup distribution in the first year that a product-pair is observed in the data. We interact output
tariffs with this indicator to allow for differential effects of output tariffs on markups for these high
markup products. The results are reported in column 3 of Table 10. The table shows a very strong
effect of output tariffs on these high markup products: a 10 percentage point decline in output
tariffs leads to a 1.04 percent fall in markups for products initially below the 90th percentile in the
markup distribution. For high markup products, the same policy reform results in an additional
4.40 percent decline in markups. In short, once we control for the incomplete pass-through of costs,
output tariffs reduce markups and these reductions are substantially more pronounced on products
with initially high markups. We observe similar patterns when we account for measurement error
in marginal costs by instrumenting in column 4.
4.4 Interpretation of Results: Variable Markups and Incomplete Pass-through
Our results call for a nuanced evaluation of the effects of the Indian trade liberalization on markups.
While we do find evidence that the tariff reductions have pro-competitive effects, especially at the
right tail of the markup distribution, our results suggest that the most significant effect of the
reforms is to reduce costs to producers. Due to variable markups, cost reductions are not passed
through completely to consumers.
This last finding raises the question of why prices do not fully respond to cost reductions. Our
results here relate to a voluminous literature on price rigidities and incomplete pass-through in
macroeconomics and international macroeconomics. While this literature has focused primarily
on exchange rate pass-through, its findings are equally relevant to tariff reductions given that
exchange rate and tariff changes have similar effects on firm profits. Structural approaches within
this literature explain incomplete pass-through through a combination of demand side and market
structure assumptions. As discussed in Section 4.2, there is a large class of potential models (i.e.,
combinations of demand side and market structure assumptions) that can generate this phenomenon.
Incomplete pass-through requires the demand elasticity perceived by the firm to be rising in price,
so any model that delivers a demand elasticity increasing in price will also deliver incomplete pass-
through. For example, this pattern can be generated in a setting with a linear consumer demand
and monopolistic competition as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). Alternatively, one could assume
CES preferences and Cournot (e.g., Atkeson and Burstein (2008)), or nested logit and Bertrand
(e.g., Goldberg (1995) or Goldberg and Verboven (2005)); or random coefficients and Bertrand
(e.g., Goldberg and Hellerstein (2013) or Nakamura and Zerom (2010)). Which assumptions are
appropriate depends on the industry under investigation. Against this background, the advantage
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of our approach is precisely the fact that it establishes the existence of incomplete pass-through
and explores its implications for trade policy without committing to a particular structure. Such
structure may be defensible in the context of Industrial Organization case studies which rely on
a careful study of the industry under consideration and its institutional setting to inform their
assumptions. But it is less defensible in the context of an analysis of the entire Indian manufacturing
sector that includes many heterogeneous industries, each likely characterized by different demand
and market conditions. Our study demonstrates that variable markups generate incomplete cost
pass-through in many different sectors, but it cannot answer the question of which fundamentals
in each case generate variable markups. To answer this last question, one would need to impose
more structure along the lines of the aforementioned studies, yet doing so would undermine the
fundamental rationale and advantage of our approach.
Our results suggest that the trade reforms benefited producers relatively more than consumers,
at least in the short run. However, this does not necessarily imply that the reform lowered con-
sumer welfare, especially in the long run. There is an active literature studying the relationship
between competition, firm profitability and innovation (e.g., see Aghion et al. (2005)). In Goldberg
et al. (2010a), we show that firms introduced many new productsaccounting for about a quarter
of output growthduring this period. If the cost reductions (and associated markup increases) in-
duced by the trade reform spurred this product growth, the benefits to consumers are potentially
substantially larger. We also observe a positive correlation between changes in firm markups and
product introductions (results available upon request).53 This suggests that firms used the input
tariff reductions and associated profit increases to finance the development of new products, imply-
ing potential long-term gains to consumers. A complete analysis of this mechanism and the impact
on welfare lies beyond the scope of this current paper.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines the adjustment of prices, markups and marginal costs in response to trade
liberalization. We take advantage of detailed price and quantity information to estimate markups
from quantity-based production functions. Our approach does not require any assumptions on the
market structure or demand curves that firms face. This feature of our approach is important in
our context since we want to analyze how markups adjust to trade reforms without imposing ex
ante restrictions on their behavior. An added advantage of our approach is that since we observe
firm-level prices in the data, we can directly compute firms' marginal costs once we have estimates
of the markups.
Estimating quantity-based production functions for a broad range of differentiated products
introduces new methodological issues that we must confront. We propose an identification strategy
based on estimating production functions on single-product firms. The advantage of this approach
53These findings are consistent with Peters (2012) who develops a model with imperfect competition that generates
heterogeneous markups which determine innovation incentives.
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is that we do not need to take a stand on how inputs are allocated across products within multi-
product firms. We also demonstrate how to correct for a bias that arises when researchers do
not observe input price variation across firms, an issue that becomes particularly important when
estimating quantity-based production functions.
The large variation in markups suggests that trade models that assume constant markups may
be missing an important channel when quantifying the gains from trade. Furthermore, our results
highlight the importance of analyzing the effects of both output and input tariff liberalization. We
observe large declines in marginal costs, particularly due to input tariff liberalization. However,
prices do not fall by as much. This imperfect pass-through occurs because firms offset the cost
declines by raising markups. Conditional on marginal costs, we find pro-competitive effects of output
tariffs on markups. Our analysis is based on data representative of larger firms, so our results are
representative of these larger firms. Our results suggest that trade liberalization can have large, yet
nuanced effects, on marginal costs and markups. Understanding the welfare consequences of these
results using models with variable markups is an important topic for future research.
Our results have broader implications for thinking about the trade and productivity across
firms in developing countries. The methodology produces quantity-based productivity measures
that can be compared with revenue-based productivity measures. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) discuss
how these measures can inform us about distortions and the magnitude of misallocation within an
economy. Importantly, our methodology can deliver quantity-based productivity measures purged
of substantial variation in markups across firms, which potentially improves upon our understanding
of the role of misallocation in generating productivity dispersion. We leave the analysis of the role
of misallocation on the distribution of these performance measures for future research.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Share of Sample 
Output All Firms
Single-Product 
Firms Products
Sector (1) (2) (3) (4)
15 Food products and beverages 10% 300 137 135
17 Textiles, Apparel 9% 331 196 78
21 Paper and paper products 3% 76 59 32
24 Chemicals 25% 462 216 483
25 Rubber and Plastic 5% 149 102 83
26 Non-metallic mineral products 6% 119 88 60
27 Basic metals 17% 232 142 101
28 Fabricated metal products 2% 76 55 45
29 Machinery and equipment 7% 171 83 186
31 Electrical machinery, communications 6% 95 55 102
34 Motor vehicles, trailers 9% 62 40 95
Total 100% 2,073 1,173 1,400
Notes: Table reports summary statistics for the sample. The first column reports the share of output by sector in 1995. Columns 2
and 3 report the number of firms and number of single-product firms manufacturing products in the sector in 1995. Column 4
reports the number of products over the full sample, 1989-2003.
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Table 2: Example of Sector, Industry and Product Classifications
NIC Code Description
27 Basic Metal Industries (Sector s )
2710 Manufacture of Basic Iron & Steel (Industry i )
130101010000 Pig iron
130101020000 Sponge iron
130101030000 Ferro alloys
130106040800 Welded steel tubular poles
130106040900 Steel tubular structural poles
130106050000 Tube & pipe fittings
130106100000 Wires & ropes of iron & steel
130106100300 Stranded wire
2731 Casting of iron and steel (Industry i )
130106030000 Castings & forgings
130106030100 Castings
130106030101 Steel castings
130106030102 Cast iron castings
130106030103 Maleable iron castings
130106030104 S.G. iron castings
130106030199 Castings, nec
Examples of Industries, Sectors and Products
Pr
od
uc
ts
 (j
)
Pr
od
uc
ts
 (j
)
Notes: This table is replicated from Goldberg et al. (2010b). For NIC 2710, there are a
total of 111 products, but only a subset are listed in the table. For NIC 2731, all products
are listed in the table. 
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Table 3: Average Output Elasticities, by Sector
Observations in 
Production 
Function 
Estimation Labor Materials Capital
Returns to 
Scale
Sector (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
15 Food products and beverages 774 0.20 0.67 0.23 1.10
[0.13] [0.20] [0.05] [0.07]
17 Textiles, Apparel 1,574 0.13 0.77 0.14 1.04
[0.06] [0.09] [0.08] [0.14]
21 Paper and paper products 470 0.25 0.65 0.02 0.92
[0.16] [0.16] [0.10] [0.09]
24 Chemicals 1,552 0.22 0.73 0.17 1.11
[0.07] [0.05] [0.07] [0.07]
25 Rubber and Plastic 705 0.13 0.67 0.09 0.89
[0.23] [0.31] [0.28] [0.67]
26 Non-metallic mineral products 632 0.25 0.43 0.02 0.70
[0.34] [0.22] [0.43] [0.66]
27 Basic metals 947 0.11 0.70 0.06 0.86
[0.20] [0.18] [0.20] [0.41]
28 Fabricated metal products 392 0.05 0.50 -0.03 0.52
[0.35] [0.34] [0.34] [1.01]
29 Machinery and equipment 702 0.32 0.57 0.34 1.24
[0.16] [0.06] [0.15] [0.19]
31 Electrical machinery & communications 761 0.08 0.64 0.02 0.74
[0.17] [0.24] [0.15] [0.47]
34 Motor vehicles, trailers 386 0.44 0.55 0.46 1.45
[0.59] [0.25] [0.63] [1.19]
Notes: Table reports the output elasticities from the production function. The first column reports the number of observations
for each production function estimation. Columns 2-4 report the average estimated output elasticity with respect to each factor
of production for the translog production function for all firms. Standard deviations of the output elasticities are reported in
brackets. The 5th column reports the average returns to scale, which is the sum of the preceding three columns.
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Table 4: Median Output Elasticities, by Sector
Labor Materials Capital
Returns 
to Scale
Sector (1) (2) (3) (4)
15 Food products and beverages 0.20 0.69 0.23 1.11
17 Textiles, Apparel 0.13 0.75 0.13 1.01
21 Paper and paper products 0.25 0.66 0.04 0.93
24 Chemicals 0.21 0.73 0.16 1.10
25 Rubber and Plastic 0.18 0.75 0.14 1.06
26 Non-metallic mineral products 0.29 0.46 0.14 0.84
27 Basic metals 0.14 0.72 0.09 0.97
28 Fabricated metal products 0.15 0.63 0.09 0.88
29 Machinery and equipment 0.32 0.57 0.33 1.18
31 Electrical machinery & communications 0.12 0.69 0.06 0.93
34 Motor vehicles, trailers 0.36 0.50 0.39 1.24
Notes: Table reports the median output elasticities from the production function. Columns 2-4
report the median estimated output elasticity with respect to each factor of production for the
translog production function for all firms. The 5th column reports the median returns to scale.
Table 5: Output Elasticities, Input Price Variation and Sample Selection
Labor Materials Capital
Returns 
to Scale Labor Materials Capital
Returns 
to Scale
Sector (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
15 Food products and beverages 0.66 0.21 1.71 2.62 0.19 0.64 0.24 1.05
17 Textiles, Apparel -0.02 0.58 -0.05 0.41 0.12 0.75 0.13 1.01
21 Paper and paper products 0.03 -0.09 -0.19 -0.48 0.27 0.62 0.03 0.92
24 Chemicals 0.71 0.67 -0.74 0.57 0.21 0.75 0.15 1.11
25 Rubber and Plastic 0.03 0.02 0.13 0.38 0.19 0.76 0.11 1.04
26 Non-metallic mineral products 0.27 0.30 0.92 1.43 0.24 0.48 0.18 0.90
27 Basic metal -0.27 0.92 0.02 0.85 0.12 0.74 0.12 0.99
28 Fabricated metal products -1.28 -0.67 2.18 0.26 0.16 0.65 0.08 0.90
29 Machinery and equipment 0.05 0.22 -0.21 0.29 0.29 0.56 0.34 1.15
31 Electrical machinery, communication -1.49 -0.08 0.31 -0.26 0.08 0.76 0.05 0.97
34 Motor vehicles, trailers 0.02 -0.46 1.63 0.84 0.26 0.53 0.31 1.07
Estimates without Correcting for Input 
Price Variation
Estimates without Correcting for Sample 
Selection
Notes: The left table reports the median output elasticities from production function estimations that do not account for input price
variation. The right panel reports the median output elasticities from production function estimations that do not account for sample
selection.
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Table 6: Markups, by Sector
Sector Mean Median
15 Food products and beverages 1.56 1.09
17 Textiles, Apparel 1.48 1.22
21 Paper and paper products 1.08 0.98
24 Chemicals 1.97 1.25
25 Rubber and Plastic 2.45 1.31
26 Non-metallic mineral products 3.22 1.51
27 Basic metals 2.57 1.11
28 Fabricated metal products 2.73 1.10
29 Machinery and equipment 1.93 1.00
31 Electrical machinery, communications 3.82 1.30
34 Motor vehicles, trailers 5.06 1.16
Average 2.24 1.18
Markups
Notes: Table displays the mean and median markup by sector for the
sample 1989-2003. The table trims observations with markups that are
above and below the 3rd and 97th percentiles within each sector. 
Table 7: Pass-Through of Costs to Prices
(1) (2) (3)
Log Marginal Costfjt 0.360 *** 0.427 *** 0.572 **
0.042    0.084    0.251
Observations 21,122 15,887 12,232
Within R-squared 0.30 0.25 0.09
Firm-Product FEs yes yes yes
Instruments - yes yes
First-Stage F-test - 59 7
Log Pricefjt
Notes: The dependent variable is (log) price. Column 1 is an OLS regression on log
marginal costs. Column 2 instruments marginal costs with input tariffs and lag marginal
costs. Column 3 instruments marginal costs with input tariffs and two-period lag
marginal costs. The regressions exclude outliers in the top and bottom 3rd percent of the
markup distribution. All regressions include firm-product fixed effects. The regressions
use data from 1989-1997. The standard errors are bootstrapped and are clustered at the
firm level.  Significance: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent. 
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Table 8: Prices and Output Tariffs, Annual Regressions
(1) (2)
Output Tariffit 0.129 ** 0.161 ***
        0.058    0.055    
Within R-squared 0.00    0.02    
Observations 21,122    21,122    
Firm-Product FEs yes yes
Year FEs yes no
Sector-Year FEs no yes
-8.0 ** -10.0 ***
3.6 3.4
Log Pricesfjt
Notes: The dependent variable is a firm-product's (log) price. Column 1 includes year
fixed effects and Column 2 includes sector-year fixed effects. The regressions
exclude outliers in the top and bottom 3rd percent of the markup distribution. All
regressions include firm-product fixed effects and use data from 1989-1997.
Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. The final row uses the average
62% decline in output tariffs from 1989-1997 to compute the mean and standard
error of the impact of trade liberalization on prices. That is, for each column the
mean impact is equal to the -0.62*100*{coefficient on output tariffs}. Significance: *
10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent. 
Overall Impact of Trade Liberalization
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Table 9: Prices, Costs and Markups and Tariffs
(1) (2) (3)
Output Tariffit 0.149 *** 0.084 0.065
        0.056    0.085    0.077
Input Tariffit 0.372 1.253 ** -0.881 *
0.303    0.523    0.489    
Within R-squared 0.02    0.01    0.01    
Observations 21,122    21,122    21,122    
Firm-Product FEs yes yes yes
Sector-Year FEs yes yes yes
-18.1 ** -35.2 *** 17.0
7.3 12.8 11.8
Log Markupfjt
Overall Impact of Trade Liberalization
Log Pricesfjt Log Marginal Costfjt
Notes: The dependent variable is noted in the columns. The sum of the coefficients from the markup and
marginal costs regression equals their respective coefficient in the price regression. The regressions
exclude outliers in the top and bottom 3rd percent of the markup distribution, and include firm-product
fixed effects and sector-year fixed effects. The final row uses the average 62% and 24% declines in output
and input tariffs from 1989-1997, respectively, to compute the mean and standard error of the impact of
trade liberalization on each performance measure. That is, for each column the mean impact is equal to
the -0.62*100*{coefficient on output tariff} + -0.24*100*{coefficient on input tariff}. The regressions use
data from 1989-1997. The table reports the bootstrapped standard errors that are clustered at the
industry level.  Significance: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent. 
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Table 10: Pro-Competitive Effects of Output Tariffs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Output Tariffit 0.125 ** 0.127 ** 0.104 ** 0.117 *
        0.049    0.061    0.051    0.061    
Output Tariffit  x Topfp                       0.440 *** 0.213
                      0.142    0.156    
Within R-squared 0.58    0.57    0.58    0.57    
Observations 21,122              15,887              21,122              15,887          
2nd-Order Marginal Cost Polynomial yes yes yes yes
Firm-Product FEs yes    yes    yes yes
Sector-Year FEs yes    yes    yes yes
Instruments no yes no yes
First-stage F-test - 8.1 - 8.1
Log Markupfjt
Notes: The dependent variable is (log) markup. All regressions include firm-product fixed effects, sector-year fixed
effects and a second-order polynomial of marginal costs (these coefficients are suppressed and available upon
request). Columns 2 and 4 instrument the second-order polynomial of marginal costs with second-order polynomial
of lag marginal costs and input tariffs. Columns 3 interacts output tariffs and the second-order marginal cost
polynomial with an indicator if a firm-product observation was in the top 10 percent of its sector's markup
distribution when it first appears in the sample. The regressions exclude outliers in the top and bottom 3rd percent
of the markup distribution. The table reports the bootstrapped standard errors that are clustered at the industry
level. Significance: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent. 
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Figure 1: Marginal Costs and Quantities
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Variables demeaned by product−year FEs.
Markups, cost and quantity outliers are trimmed below and above 3rd and 97th percentiles.
Figure 2: Markups, Costs and Product Sales Share
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Markups and marginal costs are demeaned by product−year and firm−year FEs.
Markup and marginal cost outliers are trimmed below and above 3rd and 97th percentiles.
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Figure 3: Distribution of Prices in 1989 and 1997
0
1
2
3
D
en
si
ty
−.4 −.2 0 .2 .4
Log Prices
1989 1997
Sample only includes firm−product pairs present in 1989 and 1997.
Outliers above and below the 3rd and 97th percentiles are trimmed.
Distribution of Prices
Figure 4: Distribution of Markups and Marginal Costs in 1989 and 1997
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Appendix
A A Formal Model of Input Price Variation
This appendix provides a formal economic model that rationalizes the use of a flexible polynomial
in output price, market share and product dummies to control for input prices. The model is a
more general version of the models considered in Kremer (1993) and Verhoogen (2008).
We proceed in the following steps. We first show that under the assumptions of the model, the
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quality of every input is an increasing function of output quality. Next, we show that this implies
that the price of every input will be an increasing function of output quality. In the final step, we
show that output quality can be expressed as a flexible function of output price, market share and
a set of product dummies. Having established a monotone relationship between input prices and
output quality, this implies that the price of every input can also be expressed as a function of the
above variables.
A.1 Production Function for Output Quality
In order to proceed, we must specify the production function for quality. Let vj indicate quality
of product j and ψi indicate the quality of input i used to produce product j.
54 The production
function for output quality is given by:
vj =
n∏
i=1
[ψi]
κi ωj with
∑
κi < 1 (A.1)
For example, with three inputs, the above production function takes the form:
vj = ψ
κK
K ψ
κL
L ψ
κM
M ωj
This function belongs to the class of `O-Ring' production functions discussed in Kremer (1993)
and Verhoogen (2008). The particular (multiplicative) functional form is not important; the im-
portant feature is that
∂vj
∂ψi∂ψk
> 0, ∀i, k and i 6= k. This cross-derivative implies complementarity
in the quality of inputs. A direct consequence is that higher output quality requires high quality
of all inputs (e.g., high quality material inputs are used by high-skill workers operating high-end
machinery).
In addition to the production function for quality, we assume that higher quality inputs are
associated with higher input prices. Let W i denote the sectoral average of the price of input i (e.g.,
sectoral wage) and Wi(ψi) the price of a specific quality ψ of input i. Then,
Wi(ψi)−W i = ziψi and zi > 0. (A.2)
The equation above says that in order to use higher quality inputs, a firm needs to pay higher
input prices. There are many ways to justify this relationship. For example, if input markets are
competitive but have vertical differentiation, firms must pay higher prices for higher quality inputs.
So while high quality inputs are expensive, all firms pay the same input prices conditional on input
quality.
A.2 Demand
We close the model by specifying the demand and firms' behavioral assumptions.
54Here, the subscript j denotes a particular product produced by a firm.
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The indirect utility Vnj that consumer n derives from consuming one unit of product j can be
written in general form as:
Vnj = θnvj − αpj + εnj (A.3)
where pj is output price, θn denotes the willingness to pay for quality and εnj denotes an idiosyncratic
preference shock. This specification is general and encompasses all demand models commonly used
in the literature. In its most general formulation, the specification above corresponds to the random
coefficients model. In models of pure vertical differentiation, the utility will be given by the above
expression with εnj = 0. A simple logit sets θn = θ = 1 (i.e., no observable consumer heterogeneity)
and εnj is assumed to follow the extreme value distribution. In the nested logit, θn = θ = 1 and εnj
follows the generalized extreme value distribution. Following the Industrial Organization literature,
it is convenient to define the mean utility δj of product j as δj = vj − αpj . The output quality vj
is typically modeled as a function of product characteristics.
We now show how to control for quality variation across firms using observable characteristics
using the specification in (A.3). Berry (1994) shows that the actual market share of a product (msj)
is a function of product characteristics and output price:
msj = sj (δ,σ) = sj (v,p,ϑ) (A.4)
where σ denotes a vector of density parameters of consumer characteristics and ϑ denotes a pa-
rameter vector. While the exact functional form is determined by choice of a particular demand
structure, the general insight is that market shares are a function of product characteristics (i.e.,
quality) and prices. Berry (1994) shows that equation (A.4) can be inverted to obtain the mean
utilities δ as a function of the observed market shares and the density parameters to be estimated.55
With the δ′s in hand, quality is function of output price and the mean utility. This insight is ex-
ploited by Khandelwal (2010) who uses a nested logit model to express quality as a function of
output price and conditional and unconditional market shares. In a simple logit model, quality is
a function of only output prices and unconditional market shares. Here, we use a general formula-
tion that specifies quality as a function of output price, a vector of (conditional and unconditional)
market shares and a set of product dummies:
vj = υ(pj ,msj ,D) (A.5)
The product dummies are used in lieu of product characteristics (which are not available in our data)
and can accommodate more general demand specifications such as the nested logit and random
coefficients model.
55In the random coefficients model, the δ's are solved numerically. In simpler models, one can solve for the
parameters analytically.
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A.3 The Firm's Maximization Problem
Without loss of generality, we assume that firms use prices and quality as strategic variables to
maximize profits. Conditional on exogenous (to the firm) input prices that are determined in
competitive input markets, firms choose input qualities. These choices determine the output quality
according to the quality production function in (A.1). Letmcj denote the marginal cost of producing
a product j of quality vj . The marginal cost can be written as a function of quantity produced qj ,
quality vj , a parameter vector γ and productivity ωj , mcj(qj , vj , γ, ωj).
The profit function for a firm producing product j is:
pij = N · sj [p−mcj(qj , vj(ψ, ωj), γ, ωj)] (A.6)
where N denotes the market size (number of potential consumers). Output quality vj is now
explicitly written as a function of a vector of input qualities ψ and productivity ωj using the
production function for quality in (A.1).
The first order condition with respect to price is
pj = mcj(qj , vj , γ, ωj) +
sj
|∂sj/∂pj | . (A.7)
The term sj/|∂sj/∂pj | represents the markup, and as shown in Berry (1994), p. 254) it equals
1
α [sj/(∂sj/∂δj)].
The first order condition with respect to the quality of each input i, ψi, is:
(pj −mcj) · ∂sj
∂ψi
− sj ∂mcj
∂ψi
= 0 (A.8)
From the first order condition with respect to price, we have
(pj −mcj) = sj|∂sj/∂pj | =
1
α
sj
∂sj/∂δj
. (A.9)
Substituting this latter expression for the markup into the first order condition for input quality,
we obtain:
sj
1
α
[1/(∂sj/∂δj)]
∂sj
∂ψi
− sj ∂mcj
∂ψi
= 0 (A.10)
or
1
α
[1/(∂sj/∂δj)]
[
∂sj
∂vj
∂vj
∂ψi
]
=
∂mcj
∂ψi
(A.11)
From δj = vj − αpj follows that ∂sj∂vj =
∂sj
∂δj
, and the above first order condition simplifies to:
1
α
∂vj
∂ψi
=
∂mcj
∂ψi
(A.12)
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Using the production function for quality to obtain the derivative
∂vj
∂ψi
and substituting into (A.12),
we obtain
ψi =
1
α
κivj
[
1/
∂mcj
∂ψi
]
∀i (A.13)
This expression is similar to the one derived in Verhoogen (2008), but with two differences. First, as
we have shown above, the above expression can be derived from a very general demand system and
market structure. Second, we did not assume a Leontief production technology. The last feature of
the model complicates the analysis slightly. With a Leontief production technology, the derivative
∂mcj
∂ψi
is constant, and it will be positive given the assumption that higher quality inputs demand
higher prices. However, with more general production technologies, this derivative will itself depend
on quality. We therefore need to show explicitly that ψi is an increasing function of vj . The latter
can be established using the second order conditions associated with profit maximization:
1
α
κi
∂vj
∂ψi
1
ψi
− 1
α
κivj
1
(ψi)2
− ∂
2mcj
∂ψ2i
< 0 (A.14)
1
α
κ2i
vj
(ψi)2
− 1
α
κi
vj
(ψi)2
− ∂
2mcj
∂ψ2i
< 0
Let us define function F ≡ ψi
(
∂mcj
∂ψi
)
− 1ακivj . From the implicit function theorem, ∂ψi∂vj = −
Fj
Fi
where
Fj = − 1
α
κi < 0 (A.15)
and by virtue of the second order condition,
Fi =
∂mcj
∂ψi
+ ψi
∂2mcj
∂ψ2i
− 1
α
κ2i
vj
ψi
=
1
α
κivj
1
ψi
+ ψi
∂2mcj
∂ψ2i
− 1
α
κ2i
vj
ψi
> 0 (A.16)
It follows that ∂ψi∂vj = −
Fj
Fi
> 0. That is, input quality is an increasing function of output quality for
every input.
Given the assumption that higher input quality demands a higher input price, it immediately
follows that input prices will also be an increasing function of output quality for all inputs. From
equation (A.2):
Wi(ψi) = W i + ziψi = W i + zi
1
α
κivj
[
1/
∂mcj
∂ψi
]
In light of the above discussion, each input price facing a particular firm can be expressed as a
function of the firm's output quality, Wi = g(vj). Moreover, given that output quality is a function
of output price, market share and product dummies, we have: Wi = w(pj ,msj ,D).
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B Estimation Procedure under a Special Case: Cobb-Douglas Pro-
duction Function
We present our estimation procedure under the predominantly used production function specifi-
cation in applied work: the Cobb-Douglas (CD) production function. While restrictive on the
input-substitution patterns and the output elasticities, it greatly simplifies the estimation routine
and the recovery of the input allocation terms (ρ). In addition, it helps to highlight the fundamental
identification forces as the input price correction term does not include (interactions of) deflated
expenditures.
We follow the structure of the main text (Section 3) and impose the CD functional form:
f(xfjt) = βllfjt + βmmfjt + βkkfjt. (B.1)
Following the same steps as in the main text we get the following estimating equation for the
single-product firms corresponding to equation (10). We omit the product subscript j given that
the firms used in the estimation produce a single product:
qft = βl l˜ft + βmm˜ft + βkk˜ft − Γwft + ωft + ft, (B.2)
where Γw(.) is a special case of the function B(.) in the main text, Γ = βl + βm + βk is the returns
to scale parameter, and as before wft = x˜ft − xft ∀x = {l,m, k}.
After running the first stage
qft = φt(x˜ft, zft) + ft, (B.3)
with x˜ft = {l˜ft, m˜ft, k˜ft}, we have an estimate of predicted output (φˆft). It is then immediate that
the input price correction term B(.) enters in equation (20) in a separate and additive fashion:
ωft(β, δ) = φˆft − βl l˜ft − βmm˜ft − βkk˜ft − Γw(pft,msft,D,Gft; δ), (B.4)
where −Γw(.) is a special case of the function B(.) in the main text. If one assumes a vertical
differentiation model of demand, then the input price control function w(.) will take only output price
as its argument, and the last term in (B.4) becomes Γw(pft, δ). We form moments on ξft(β, δ) by
exploiting the same law of motion of productivity in equation (18), and the same timing assumptions
as in the main text.
To estimate markups and marginal costs we need the input allocation terms ρfjt. In the case of
the CD, their derivation is simplified to solving the system of equations given by:
ωft + Γρfjtŵfjt = φˆfjt − βl l˜ft − βmm˜ft − βkk˜ft (B.5)
where ŵfjt is the input price term that we compute based on the estimated function w(.) and Γ is
defined as above. Taking into account that
∑
j exp (ρfjt) = 1, this results in a system of Jft + 1
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equations (one for each product j produced by firm f at time t, plus the summing up constraint
for the input allocations) in Jft + 1 unknowns (the Jft input allocations for each firm-year pair and
firm productivity) and we can solve for ρfjt and ωft.
We now have all we need to compute markups and marginal costs. The major difference is that
θMfjt = βm, so that all the variation in markups (and marginal costs) comes from the expenditure
share αfjt.
C Data Appendix
We use the Prowess data, compiled by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE),
that spans the period from 1989 to 2003. In addition to standard firm-level variables, the data
include annual sales and quantity information on firms' product mix. Although Prowess uses an
internal product classification that is based on the Harmonized System (HS) and National Industry
Classification (NIC) schedules, our version of Prowess did not explicitly link the product names
reported by the firms to this classification. We hired two research assistants, working independently,
to map the codes to the product names reported by firms. The research assistants assigned product
codes with identical NIC codes in 80% of the cases, representing 91% of output. A third research
assistant resolved the differences between the mappings done by the first two research assistants by
again manually checking the classifications.
To estimate the production function, we need firm-level labor, capital and materials. Prowess
does not have reliable employment information, so we use the total wage bill (which includes bonuses
and contributions to employees' provident funds) as our measure for labor. Materials are defined as
the consumption of commodities by an enterprise in the process of manufacturing or transformation
into product. It includes raw material expenses and consumption of stores and spares. Capital is
measured by gross fixed assets, which includes movable and immovable assets. These variables are
deflated by two-digit NIC wholesale price indexes.
We match the firm variables to tariff data. The tariff data are reported at the six-digit HS level
and were compiled by Topalova (2010). We pass the tariff data through India's input-output matrix
for 1993-94 to construct input tariffs. We concord the tariffs to India's NIC schedule developed by
Debroy and Santhanam (1993). Formally, input tariffs are defined as τ inputit =
∑
k akiτ
output
kt , where
τoutputkt is the tariff on industry k at time t, and aki is the share of industry k in the value of industry
i.
D Markups and Monopsony Power
If firms have monopsony power, this would alter the first order conditions in Section 3.1 (equations
3-5). We briefly discuss under which conditions our main results, relating markups to tariff changes,
are not affected.
Consider a firm that produces just one product, and suppose production requires just one flexible
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input V vft. The Lagrangian in this case would be:
L = W vftV vft + λft
(
Qft −Qft
(
V vft, ωft
))
. (D.1)
Taking first order conditions and allowing for monopsony power gives:
∂L
∂V vft
= W vft +
∂W vft
∂V vft
V vft − λft
∂Q(.)
∂V vft
= 0. (D.2)
If a firm has no monopsony power,
∂W vft
∂V vft
= 0. For firms with monopsony power,
∂W vft
∂V vft
< 0: the
more the firm buys, the lower the price of the input. We can rearrange the FOC as:
W vft +
∂W vft
∂V vft
V vft = λft
∂Q(.)
∂V vft
(D.3)
The Lagrange multiplier remains: λft = Pft/µft , we get
µft
(
W vft +
∂W vft
∂V vft
V vft
)
= Pft
∂Q(.)
∂V vft
. (D.4)
If we now compare a firm with and without monopsony power, ceteris paribus, the markup for
the firm with monopsony power will be larger. This implies that we may be under-estimating the
markup by ignoring potential monopsony power.
However, even if our estimates of the markup levels were biased due to the existence of monop-
sony power, it is still unlikely that our conclusions regarding the effects of tariffs on markups and
costs would be affected. To see this, note that the above expression can be simplified to56
µft = (θftα
−1
ft )/(1 + υft). (D.5)
where υ is the elasticity of the input price with respect to the quantity of the input purchased
υft =
∂W vft
∂V vft
V vft
W vft
, and the other variables are as defined in the main text. If there is no monopsony
power, then υft = 0, and the markup expression corresponds to the one we use in the main text of
the paper. Taking logs of the more general markup expression implies that in our trade regressions
(see Section 4.3) we run lnµft + ln (1 + υft) against output and input tariffs (in multi-product
firms, markups and input price elasticities would be indexed by both firm f and product j). The
inclusion of firm-product fixed effects implies that we will only bias our results if the input price
elasticity changed post-trade reforms. Moreover, we have two empirical pieces of evidence that our
results are robust to monopsony power. We might expect that the firms that are most likely to have
monopsony power are larger firms or firms that are parts of Indian business groups. However we
do not find differential effects of the trade reform across initial firm sizes or if a firm belongs to a
56Dividing through by W v, and dividing and multiplying the right-hand-side by (V v/Q), and rearranging terms.
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business group.57 This leads us to believe that monopsony power is not a first order concern in our
setting.
57Results are available upon request.
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